

# bulletin

*The Conflict, Security  
& Development Group*

## Sri Lanka's 17-year war of attrition appears to be reaching a critical and decisive juncture.

The scale and direction of the fighting between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan security forces suggest that the LTTE is close to victory – if its leadership chooses to see it that way.

In November 1999, the LTTE launched a massive counter-offensive in the north-east, 'Unceasing Waves III'. They immediately captured key towns along the A9 trunk road, an important supply route. On 27 April, the Tamils took control of the seemingly impenetrable and strategically important Elephant Pass, cutting the Government's already tenuous supply lines to the Jaffna peninsula. Following the evacuation of some 17,000 Sri Lankan troops from the Elephant Pass garrison, the Tamils began to move towards Jaffna city. Approximately 35,000 Govern-

ment soldiers are now isolated in Jaffna, where civilians, fearing another bloodbath, are heeding LTTE demands to leave the city.

It appears to be a question of when, rather than if, the Tigers will take the entire north-eastern peninsula. The LTTE already control the Vanni and parts of the region around the natural harbour of Trincomalee (the second biggest in Asia). Consequently, a state of *Lesser Eelam* – based on full control of the peninsula, plus a semblance of control in parts of the north-east – is potentially within the LTTE's grasp. Some Tigers, though, may want the movement to hold out for a *Greater Eelam* – although where this entity begins and ends is unclear. *Eelam* is an elastic political concept: it is usually understood to encapsulate the Jaffna peninsula, as well as a stretch of territory down the north-east of Sri Lanka.

### **The Government's predicament**

In mid-1995, Government forces launched their largest military operation against the Tigers, and succeeded in ejecting them from

*In this issue* Dr Chris Smith on Sri Lanka, Nici Dahrendorf on penal reform in Rwanda, *Operational Focus* by Dylan Hendrickson on 'ghost' soldiers, *Policy Brief* on Ethiopia and Eritrea, plus regular features *Web Watch*, *Timeline*, *Update* and *Pointers*.


Jaffna city. In the past five years, however, the armed forces have failed to consolidate their hold, primarily because of their inability to safeguard military supply lines into the Vanni and the peninsula. This was underlined in late June when the LTTE carried out a suicide-bomb attack on a private merchant vessel, requisitioned by the military to transport essential supplies to the peninsula. The international media has been kept at a discreet distance, but there is little disguising the Government's current predicament.

As pressure mounts, the Government's options are diminishing. Airlifting the beleaguered 35,000 troops out of the peninsula would result in the LTTE taking *de facto* control; leaving them there would make it impossible to shore up defence lines further south and east. In any case, Palali Air Base is the only realistic point of entry; the Sri Lankan air force has lost planes due to LTTE surface-to-air missile attacks. Sooner or later, hunger and disease are bound to affect the troops, making them less effective wherever they end up being deployed.

The quality of both military equipment and recruits has slowly declined. Political and ethical constraints have made it more difficult for Western arms exporters to transfer lethal weapons to an area of conflict and to a Government with a dubious human-rights record. Supplies still come from Israel and China, but Sri Lanka's buying power is severely limited.

In addition, the security forces have not received the necessary training—the speed at which the army lost control of the Vanni in October 1999 was considered especially inept. Morale is low and rates of desertion are soaring. Regular amnesties, if anything, encourage desertion. A recent campaign to recruit 15,000 new troops only secured the services of around 2,000 personnel.

Setbacks in the conflict coincided with a number of interesting political manoeuvres in Colombo. The opposition United National Party agreed to a consultation process that would have included the parties to, and victims of, the war—such as Muslim traders, as well as Tamils and Sinhalese. But a suicide-bomb attack against President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga on 18 December 1999 slowed and eventually reversed these promising signs of bipartisan co-operation. Kumaratunga has now withdrawn the backing of her People's Alliance party. Early in 2000, Norway offered to act as an impartial facilitator, a proposal that, initially, seemed to have broad support within the country, but now appears to have stalled.



In the south, there are discernible signs of war weariness—hardly a poor family remains untouched by the conflict. The number of dead and wounded, including landmine victims, increases relentlessly. Evacuating the injured from the peninsula now takes up to 24 hours. Furthermore, deserters are returning not only with tales of failure, but also with their weapons. Armed crime and political violence are, therefore, escalating. Yet, despite this fatigue and recent LTTE advances, the Sinhalese population still expects the Government to achieve a military solution. Political compromises could increase support for the radical *Janatha Vimikethi Peramuna* party.

Parliamentary elections are due by October 2000. The Tamils that voted for the ruling People's Alliance in the expectation that Kumaratunga would negotiate a peace settlement will probably defect. Any move to postpone the polls would seriously disappoint the donor community. Sri Lanka currently nets around \$900 million in aid and assistance—coincidentally, the same amount as the Government spends on defence.

### **The LTTE predicament**

The Tigers' ruthless dedication to the cause remains intact, and there is no shortage of equipment, money and recruits—including a greater reliance on women and child soldiers. The LTTE will thus be confident that Jaffna city can be regained. Quite what to do once Jaffna is taken, however, is a problem. The LTTE does not have a political entity—like the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) and *Sinn Féin*—to oversee a transition from war to peace. The consensus may be to continue with the struggle. After 17 years of war and privation, tens of thousands of deaths, and constant ideological indoctrination, it may be hard for the LTTE leadership to opt for anything less.

LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran is more of a 'warlord' than a political tactician. Prabhakaran might preside over a new state, but he probably cannot run one. This suggests that he will continue to make lackadaisical overtures for peace, build up weapons and troops, and then return to war. If the LTTE ever achieves a state of *Eelam*, though, the international human-rights-community's opprobrium will make it a pariah from the outset. The international community is displeased with LTTE policies, such as its use of women and child soldiers, and is trying to prevent expatriate funds from reaching the war zone.

### **The international predicament**

The international community has kept faith—just—with successive Sri Lankan Governments and their attempts to end the war. The LTTE's brutality and behaviour has reinforced the default tendency to support and shore up the state against the insurgents. There appears to have been tacit acknowledgement that the Government should receive full political support to eliminate the LTTE as a threat to the state.

But the donor community cannot continue to provide development aid, as opposed to humanitarian assistance, to a country where governance is in severe decline and the economy is relatively robust for a state at war with itself. Some observers predict the termination of smaller aid programmes over the next decade. This will leave the major donors—such as Japan and the Asian Development Bank, neither of which appear especially aware of the impact of aid on conflict—with greater relative control over assistance. As a result, current efforts to link aid and conflict may well be short-lived.

Although it seems unlikely at present, any serious move towards a peace settlement, or

# pointers

an outright victory for the LTTE, would inevitably lead to a fundamental re-evaluation of aid priorities by all of the significant donors in Sri Lanka. The conflict has left the Jaffna peninsula desperately impoverished, whereas many other parts of the country have fared reasonably well. Therefore, many donors may think hard about moving development aid from the south to the north. Unless this is achieved with immense diplomacy and consultation, the Sinhalese will feel that the Tamils in the north have robbed them of foreign resources. This would have implications for the Tamils in the south.

Sri Lanka's geo-political insignificance will count against any request for international intervention. Current global commitments to peace-support operations involve some 30,000 troops from 76 countries. Sri Lanka does not have the political weight to move its case up the international agenda. The response has been to turn to India.

## The Indian predicament

Given India's disastrous and costly intervention in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990, it is not surprising that New Delhi has sought to minimise its role in the Sri Lankan quagmire. India has offered Sri Lanka a loan of \$100m in development and humanitarian assistance. Beyond this, it has ruled out military intervention or arms sales to Colombo, but, at the same time, is opposed to third-party intervention. Meanwhile, the Sri Lankan Government, and even some of the Buddhist clergy who opposed the 1987 intervention, are pleading for India to act.

New Delhi has spent the past 25 years building up its great-power credentials and consolidating its regional pre-eminence. To underscore the need for a regional solution, the US has stated its intention to defer to India on Sri Lanka. India must also address

► India and Israel have agreed to set up a joint commission to combat terrorism, based on strategic discussions every six months. Israel is not willing to provide direct anti-terrorist assistance, but is keen to build up its defence contracts and is open to sharing intelligence. Neither New Delhi nor Tel Aviv specified which groups are viewed as a threat.

► The UK has lifted its arms embargo on Pakistan. The export of small arms and ammunition, however, will still be blocked. Since the coup, all 46 applications for export licences from British companies have been rejected. Twenty of these will now be approved.

the trickle of refugees drifting across the Palk Strait—which may soon become a flood.

Also significant for India are reports that Israel is supporting the Sri Lankan Government's war effort, possibly in return for the right to test cruise missiles. While vigorously denied by Colombo, if true, this would create foreign-policy problems for India because New Delhi has often stated that intervention from beyond the region is unwelcome.

## Conclusion

For the moment, the LTTE advance looks to have slowed. But the Tigers will mount another offensive. With the peninsula in LTTE hands, and with Sri Lankan Government forces in disarray, it may be impossible to avoid negotiations over partition.

Dr Chris Smith, Director of the CSDG

# operational focus

## *Demobilising 'ghost' soldiers*

The elimination of 'ghost' soldiers—sometimes seen as the 'administrative' component of a demobilisation process—is key to improving the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of the military. A number of countries' armed forces, like other branches of the public sector, comprise fewer personnel than official numbers indicate. Some soldiers (the ghosts) only exist as names on paper. It is presumed that unscrupulous commanders pocket their salaries, and that this money could be used more productively, especially for social investment.

The demobilisation of 'real' soldiers is a complicated, politically-sensitive and expensive undertaking, particularly if a comprehensive re-integration package is included. In contrast, the demobilisation of ghost soldiers would appear to be a much easier and faster way to achieve a substantial and immediate reduction in military spending, and one with fewer negative social consequences. Essentially, the initial challenge is technical in nature: establishing more rigorous procedures for the management of budgets and personnel. Once the ghosts have been identified, it is simply a matter of taking them off the payroll.

The reality, however, is much more complex. Powerful vested interests benefit from the existence of ghost soldiers, making it immensely difficult to identify and to eliminate them. Moreover, as Cambodia's experience suggests, unless handled carefully the demobilisation of ghost soldiers can have a negative social impact, as the livelihoods of many people depend on their salaries.

There are different kinds of ghost soldiers and beneficiaries, who can be categorised as follows:

- soldiers who exist in name only. This includes those who have either left the army or have been killed in action (but remain listed on the official payroll), or who never existed in the first place. Although their unit commanders pocket the salaries, this cannot be dismissed as straightforward corruption. In some cases, the commanders use the money to buy much needed food

and medicine for their troops, with whom they may enjoy close bonds of loyalty;

- former combatants killed in action, but whose salaries are collected by their widows or by other family members. In this instance, the wages provide, in effect, a social 'safety-net', ensuring a regular pension for vulnerable former dependants, who would otherwise receive no public assistance; and
- soldiers who are still formally registered in the army, but who have decided to seek employment in the private sector—often working for private-security firms that pay much higher salaries. Typically, their commander allows them to be temporarily 'absent' from duty. The soldiers keep the status of their association with the military, and the commander collects their wages until they return to the unit.

In May 1999, the Cambodian Government announced that it had identified 12,682 ghost soldiers. These soldiers had apparently amassed scores of 'virtual' and real dependants: some 7,000 'ghost' spouses and 105,234 'ghost' children. All soldiers in Cambodia are eligible for a spousal allowance and a family rice ration to augment their paltry monthly salary of \$18–20. Commanders who collect the salaries, therefore, have an incentive to ensure that the ghost soldiers in their units have large immediate families.

When it comes to demobilising ghost soldiers, the dilemma is in distinguishing between real and fictitious soldiers and dependants, and identifying those who

## operational focus

*continued*

deserve compensation. This dilemma is compounded by the immense external pressure put on Cambodia by the IMF and the World Bank to downsize rapidly its army. Lacking either the will or the capacity to register properly and count its soldiers, the Government has instead produced arbitrary statistics to satisfy donor demands. However, without a clear profile of its ghost soldiers there is a greater risk that the demobilisation process will increase the vulnerability of certain social groups.

To an extent this problem has been recognised by both donors and the Government. An attempt has been made, for instance, to transfer official responsibility for the genuine spouses of deceased soldiers to the Ministry responsible for women's affairs. Unfortunately, this Ministry does not have the necessary resources, and the military has so far resisted handing over any of the savings accrued from the elimination of ghost soldiers. It argues that the money would be better spent on professionalising those soldiers who remain in the army by paying them higher salaries.

Dylan Hendrickson, Research Fellow

## policy brief

Ethiopia and Eritrea have ostensibly endorsed the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)'s initiative to resolve their two-year border conflict. Their positions on implementation, however, shift according to the military situation on the ground. The OAU's peace plan is made up of three key documents:

### **Framework Agreement**

Immediately accepted by Ethiopia in December 1998; Eritrea only did so in February 1999 after losing Badme (clashes in this town on 6 May 1998 sparked the war).

### **Modalities Document**

Provides details for the implementation of the Framework Agreement. Accepted by the two parties in July 1999.

### **Technical Arrangements**

Put to both sides in August 1999, this elaborates on the Modalities Document and includes details on the disengagement of forces along the disputed border. Eritrea accepted immediately; Ethiopia asked for clarifications, claiming that the arrangements did not allow for

a return to the *status quo ante* before 6 May 1998.

As Ethiopia and Eritrea haggled over definitions of withdrawal and accused each other of intransigence, almost 600,000 soldiers were mobilised along the frontier. But the 12 May 2000 Ethiopian offensive decisively reconfigured the military situation, opening the way for a renewed drive to implement the OAU plan.

The 18 June cease-fire creates a 25km buffer zone inside Eritrean territory to be filled by UN peacekeepers, operating under OAU auspices. This is a neat compromise between the Eritrean desire for a UN-driven peace process and Ethiopia's preference for an OAU observer mission. Ethiopian troops are to return to pre-war positions within two weeks of the UN deployment.

On 3 July, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan sent a high-level team to assess what the organisation can do to support the cease-fire arrangement. There are plans to send liaison officers—who could be followed by military observers—to Addis Ababa and Asmara to help in the planning for a 2,000–4,000-strong peacekeeping mission. Deployment of the force is subject, of course, to the approval of the Security Council and the warring parties.

# Penal reform in Rwanda

One of the consequences of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda was a confused and deeply traumatised society, with entrenched social and ethnic divisions. The professional middle classes, including magistrates and civil servants, were either exiled, imprisoned or killed. And Government structures appear disorganised and under-resourced, although there are signs of gradual improvement.

In an attempt to bring the perpetrators to justice, a spate of arrests took place. As a result, Rwanda's prisons, community lock-ups – 'cachots' – and military detention centres are vastly overcrowded. The problem was made worse in 1998 by the repatriation of Rwandan refugees, primarily Hutus, from the volatile Democratic Republic of Congo. The overall prison population increased from some 80,000 to 120,000, but it has remained relatively stable for the past two years.

By the end of 1999, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had registered the following detainees:

- around 87,000 in the country's 19 prisons;
- 31,000 in its cachots; and
- 1,200 in military detention centres.

While 6,300 inmates were released, a further 4,900 were rearrested and approximately 1,000 detainees died through illness.

## The prison system

Cases are processed slowly and trials take a long time to complete, aggravating the problem of overcrowding. Indeed, roughly 85% of detainees have yet to be charged or brought to court. The Government initiated genocide trials, culminating in the public execution of 12 prisoners in 1998. So far, only around 2,500 people have been tried, 14% of whom were condemned to death.

Since 1994, the International Criminal Tribunal (ICT) in Arusha, Tanzania, has been operating a parallel system of justice. It has also been slow to bring people to trial and to establish adequate witness-protection schemes. Moreover, administrative and political teething problems, and a contentious decision to release a key architect of the genocide due to lack of evidence, have strained relations between the ICT and the Rwandan authorities.

The Government plans to revive a traditional form of popular justice, referred to as 'gacaca'. It will function at three different administrative levels: community; sector; and commune. The population that was living in the hills during the genocide will act as 'witness, judge and party'.

The gacaca system will consider three categories of genocide suspects: persons who were ordered to murder; those who, acting on orders, caused physical injury and committed rape; and those who stole or destroyed property. This could involve as many as 100,000 defendants – up to 80% of whom could potentially be grouped into the first category.

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have criticised the proposed system as being only quasi legal, since it neither guarantees the right to legal counsel for the accused, nor ensures that the defendant is heard by a panel of judges. Thousands of

courts will be established at every administrative level; the authority to judge extremely serious charges—with penalties as severe as life imprisonment—will be placed in the hands of people with minimal training. This could result in grave violations of the rights of both

## The issue of prison overcrowding . . . ignites volatile social and political tensions

the accused and the victims. It is, therefore, essential that donors carefully monitor this daunting logistical and administrative challenge and assess its social implications.

### **Prison conditions**

Conditions in Rwandan prisons are well below international standards. The institutions are characterised by poor hygiene, disease and serious overcrowding, as well as by the detention of women, children and juveniles alongside adult males, and the limited rights given to prisoners sentenced to death.

Another complicating factor is the 18,000 or so detainees who confessed to genocide-related crimes on the understanding that they would receive reduced sentences, or even be granted their freedom. In some jails, these prisoners have to be protected from reprisal attacks by inmates who resent their confessions. And to make the situation even more complex, prisoners charged with other offences are intermingled with those accused of genocide-related crimes.

The issue of prison overcrowding, however, ignites volatile social and political tensions. Public opinion is fundamentally hostile to, and people are fearful of, those accused of

genocide. For instance, there was fierce resistance to the Rwandan Government's announcement in October 1998 that it intended to release 10,000 prisoners *sans dossier*—survivors of the genocide argued that it amounted to a denial of justice. Those released were either targeted by communities or found it hard to reintegrate; some former inmates even returned to prison voluntarily.

The prison system is both overwhelmed and held in low regard. The situation has been aggravated by successive changes in the ministries responsible for the prison service. As a result, management, the administration of justice, public safety and the protection and rehabilitation of inmates are in disarray. In this atmosphere, an internal judging process is beginning to emerge within prisons. Social organisation is based on tightly controlled hierarchical units, reminiscent of Rwandan society before 1994. Arrested former Government officials, section and commune leaders control detainees and interact with the prison service and visitors.

Despite the lack of resources and competent personnel, the prison service is in the process of reorganising itself. The prison portfolio, for example, has been transferred from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Interior. There have also been attempts to improve management capacity. At the end of 1999, 17 of the 19 prison directors were dismissed, some 15 of whom have been jailed for corruption and maltreatment of prisoners. This indicates both the extent of malpractice and the efforts being made to counter it. Any capacity-building initiatives have to be methodical and coherent in order to guarantee the necessary political and social support, and to ensure that new personnel in the prison service can apply what they have learnt.

It is increasingly obvious that prison reform is essential for the administration of justice,



and for the reconciliation process. Yet, the Rwandan Government and the international donor community have both been reluctant to fund penal reform. A shift in donor attitude is occurring, though, illustrated by the proposed construction of a new prison. Nevertheless, out of the plethora of international non-governmental organisations and multilateral organisations present in Rwanda, only Penal Reform International (PRI) and the ICRC work in prisons. PRI is training prison staff at all levels, as well as funding income generating and agricultural activities in and around prisons. The ICRC supplies food and basic health-care services, but these are gradually being cut on the understanding that the Ministry of Interior will take over. However, many prisons complain that food and medicine, supposedly being supplied by the Ministry, are not reaching them.



Photo: Associated Press

Hutu prisoners at Gikondo prison in Kigali, Rwanda.

### Juvenile justice

A juvenile justice system is urgently required. Among the detainees in Rwanda's prison system are individuals who were under the age of 14 when arrested—some were as young as 10—and, therefore, were below the age of criminal responsibility according to national law. There are also those who were between 14 and 18 years of age at the time of the alleged crime, and, consequently, while criminally responsible, their minority

constitutes a mitigating circumstance. Infants accompanying their accused mothers further complicate the picture.

The majority of these so-called minors has spent their adolescence in prison and will need careful training and psychological support if they are to be released and reintegrated into society. The introduction of community service is one idea under discussion, but this would also require assistance to, and the sensitisation of, communities.

### Conclusion

The administration of justice must be improved in order to reduce the number of inmates in Rwanda's prisons. Projects need to work towards coexistence and eventual reconciliation. Curiously, very few efforts and little donor funding focus on victims. The current debate centres on the issue of compensation to survivors and to the

relatives of victims. Those who have already confessed, for example, could contribute part of their salary towards a victims' fund. Other programmes could involve prisoners constructing houses for widows, and providing agricultural assistance in the fields.

Another ostracised group, representing perhaps 10% of

Rwandan society, is the families of prisoners. Many have lost their property and have not been re-housed, and a lack of money makes it difficult to send their children to school. This is a forgotten group, but one that could play an extremely useful role in bringing about some form of coexistence in affected communities.

Nici Dahrendorf, Senior Research Fellow  
(Social Development)

# time *line*

## **17–21 July 2000 Workshop: Practical Strategies for Agencies Working in Areas of Tension and Conflict** (Birmingham, UK)

Organised by the not-for-profit training and consultancy programme, Responding to Conflict. Based within Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham.

E-mail [enquiries@respond.org](mailto:enquiries@respond.org)

## **24–27 July 2000 The Challenges for Governance in Africa** (Wilton park, UK)

E-mail [fiona.fung@wiltonpark.org.uk](mailto:fiona.fung@wiltonpark.org.uk)

## **4–8 September 2000 Field Diplomacy Initiative Summer Course in Sustainable Peacebuilding and Field Diplomacy** (European Centre La Foresta, Vaalbeek, Belgium).

E-mail [fdi@online.be](mailto:fdi@online.be)

## **14–16 September 2000 Cultures of Political Transition** (London, UK)

Organised by the Institute of Commonwealth Studies. Subjects include:

- Globalisation and Human Rights;
- Law and Memory; and
- Local Healing, Reconciliation and Conflict Resolution.

Contact Stephanie Kearins +44 (0)20 7862 8825. E-mail [skearins@sas.ac.uk](mailto:skearins@sas.ac.uk)

## **22 September 2000 Proliferation of Small Arms: What Control and Limitation Policy will the European Union Apply?** (Paris, France)

A meeting for non-governmental organisations will follow on 23 September.

For more information, see:

[www.obsarm.org/armes-legeres.htm](http://www.obsarm.org/armes-legeres.htm)

# web *watch*

[www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/rel/icps](http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/rel/icps)

## **International Centre for Prison Studies**

Projects include a Manual on Human Rights Training for Prison Staff.

[www.penalreform.org](http://www.penalreform.org)

## **Penal Reform International (PRI)**

Information about their approach to penal reform, including needs assessments and technical assistance. PRI works in the following regions:

- Caribbean and Latin America;
- Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia;
- Middle East and Maghreb;
- South Asia; and
- Sub-Saharan Africa.

[www.primenet.com/~ephrem](http://www.primenet.com/~ephrem)

## **Eritrean Community Online**

Includes Government press releases on the border conflict with Ethiopia.

[www.ethiospokes.net](http://www.ethiospokes.net)

## **Ethiopian Government Spokesman**

Official site providing press releases and Government statements and articles relating to the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict. Also see reports on the economy and governance.

[www.eelamweb.com](http://www.eelamweb.com)

## **Eelam Web**

Includes background and updates on the Tamil Tiger offensive in Sri Lanka. Links to Tamil sources of information.

[www.priu.gov.lk](http://www.priu.gov.lk)

## **Official Sri Lankan Government website**

See security reports and feature articles.

**Dr Chris Smith** has been finalising a conflict-impact-assessment report on Sri Lanka, and has given several radio interviews on developments in the conflict. Chris has published an article on Sri Lanka in *World Today*, and another piece in *Disarmament Forum* on the 2001 UN light-arms conference. Chris chaired the small-arms workshop at the Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction (CPR) Network.

**Dr Susan Woodward** left the CSDG on 1 June to complete a book on the destabilising consequences of international interventions to end civil wars. She is pursuing a new research project at the Centre for Defence Studies on emerging security complexes.

**Colonel Phil Wilkinson OBE** is currently 'off contract' from the CSDG. He is working on a CDS contract with the Government of Rwanda, writing a background paper in order to assist the Government, in collaboration with Rwandan civil society, with the development of a security white paper. CDS is also conducting a threat assessment for the Rwandan Government.

**Nici Dahrendorf** went to Rwanda to evaluate relevant programmes for Penal Reform International. She was a resource person for the CPR network, providing information on children in armed conflict, human trafficking, and civil-military relations. At a meeting on Justice in Transition in New York, organised by the Ford Foundation and the US Institute for Peace, Nici gave a paper on the establishment of a truth commission and reconciliation processes in Bosnia and Rwanda. She is currently leading a multi-disciplinary team (funded by DFID) to East Timor.

The team is addressing demobilisation and establishment of an East Timorese Defence Force for the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor.

**Dr Comfort Ero** gave a presentation on Sierra Leone at the CPR Network. She also briefed, with Philip Wilkinson, the UK Conservative Backbencher Defence Committee on events in Sierra Leone and provided commentary on the renewed crisis to the media. Comfort delivered a paper on 'Reforming the Security Sector' at a conference on 'State, Conflict and Intervention in Sierra Leone' in Oxford. In addition, she attended the 'Ghana-South Africa Roundtable on Security Sector Reform and Democratisation', hosted by African Security Dialogue and Research organisation.

**Dylan Hendrickson** has been preparing a study on off-budget military expenditure and 'ghost' soldiers. He gave a talk on military-spending matters at a gathering of senior managers from aid agencies in Oxford, and led a seminar discussion on security-sector-reform issues at the Joint Services Staff College, Bracknell, UK. Dylan also presented a paper on the 'International Security Sector Reform Agenda' at the Ghana-South Africa Roundtable, and he was a resource person for the CPR Network.

**Roxanne Bazergan** continued her research, with Comfort Ero, on small arms, and she wrote a concept paper on the relationship between HIV/AIDS and security. In addition, she was a rapporteur at the CPR Network.

**Richard Jones** redesigned and produced the Centre's Global Security Studies monograph series and continued to edit, produce and market CSDG publications. In addition, he jointly completed work on an initial 'mock-up' of the CSDG journal. Richard also attended a course on Photoshop 5.5.

**Thomas Withington** completed an article for the Royal United Services Institute on Russia-India weapons transfers. He also produced material for a forthcoming *Jane's Intelligence Review* report on India's armed forces. In addition, Thomas has been editing book reviews for the CSDG Journal, and is organising the security-sector-reform information database.

# bulletin

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