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Supporting Security Sector Reform: Review of the Role of External Actors

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CONTENTS

SUMMARY

The success of security sector reform efforts depends to a significant degree on domestic vision and political commitment to a reform process. At the same time, appropriately designed and delivered external support can make a substantial contribution to reform processes.

This paper identifies the major external actors that may be involved in security sector reform – the security actors, the development and financial assistance actors, and the non-state actors.

The paper reviews the patterns of security assistance during the Cold War period, when security sector reform was not on the agenda of either the major powers or the major development agencies. Although the pattern of security assistance began to change and development agencies became more actively involved in supporting security sector reforms during the late 1990s, relatively little assistance had been provided by the development actors for capacity building or institutional development in the defence sphere by the end of the decade.

Consonant with the emerging consensus on the importance of a sound institutional base for the success of development efforts aimed at reducing poverty and promoting the growth of democratic principles and practices, external assistance to security sector reform should focus on the *process* of managing the security sector. This requires that external actors:

● develop a comprehensive overview of the issues comprising security sector reform across all relevant areas of development, foreign, and security policy;

● identify the various actors and mechanisms available to support security sector reform and agree how these actors can work together productively;

● foster commitment on the part of local leadership to the process of reform;

● understand the importance of building on what exists locally and taking local ownership seriously;

● prioritise confidence-building measures in interactions with local counterparts; and

● adopt a long term view.

A. INTRODUCTION

1. During the 1990s, the traditional definition of security, which focused on protecting the state against external aggression, expanded to include the security of individuals against repression and crime, economic and social stability, and opportunities for effective political participation on the part of all citizens. Under this broader definition, a wide range of national actors needs to be engaged in providing security.

In November 1999, senior military and civilian officials from 43 African countries attended the inaugural seminar of the US-funded Africa Center for Strategic Studies in Dakar, along with representatives of the United States and several European countries. The participants identified the following internal and external threats to national security:

Internal: ethnic conflict, poverty, poor governance, displaced persons/refugees, and natural disasters.

External: indebtedness, international conditionality, regional instability, and arms imports.

Additionally, the artificial borders created by colonialism were cited as a cause of conflict and political instability.

Source: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "Senior Leader Seminar, Dakar, Senegal, 1-12 November 1999. Academic Summary," p. 10.

2. The success of security sector reform depends in the first instance on social and political conditions in the reforming country. First of all, the national leadership must be committed to a significant reform process. Second, the principles, policies, laws, and structures that are promoted must be rooted in the reforming country's history, culture, legal framework, and institutions. Third, the reform process should be consultative in nature, and provide civil society in its various manifestations ample opportunity to contribute.

3. Despite the importance of domestic vision and political commitment to reform, appropriately designed and delivered external support can significantly benefit reform processes. This support can take many forms and requires inputs from a wide variety of external actors with different competencies. Key factors in determining the success of this support are the degree to which it is sustained, co-ordinated and aligned with local needs and priorities.

4. This paper begins by identifying the major external actors that may be involved in security sector reform. It then examines patterns of security assistance during the Cold War period and during the 1990s. It concludes by offering some observations on the ways in which external actors can most effectively contribute to promoting good governance in the security sector.

B. THE MAJOR EXTERNAL ACTORS

5. There are three major categories of external actors whose support for security sector reform may be sought:

a) security,
b) development/financial actors, and
c) non-state.

These actors may operate at the international, national or regional levels.

6. **The security actors** most likely to be involved in providing support to security sector reform are:

- members of security forces from donor countries – armed forces, police forces, and intelligence services – and relevant civil authorities – such as ministries of defence, justice and interior;
- members of internationally-constituted peacekeeping forces or civilian police missions; and
- representatives of regional security organisations (NATO, OSCE, ASEAN Regional Security Forum), regional security forces (ECOMOG), or regional training centres (Marshall Center, Africa Center for Strategic Studies).

7. **The development/financial actors** capable of supporting security-sector reform with advice, information, analysis, financing, technical assistance, and co-ordination services include:

- bilateral development assistance agencies; and
- multilateral financial and development assistance agencies (World Bank, IMF, UNDP, regional development banks).

8. **Non-state actors** are playing an increasingly important role both in assisting security sector reform, generally as part of an effort supported by a bilateral or multilateral actor. But some of them constrain security sector reform through the unregulated provision of arms and through non-transparent commercial deals with security forces and civil authorities:

- private security companies (such as MPRI in the Balkans and Nigeria for the US government);
- arms producers, arms-trade middlemen, and other commercial enterprises; and,
- international or regional non-governmental organisations.

"The US-based private security firm, MPRI, describes its international activities as follows: "MPRI's current international efforts are centered in the Balkans, where the company conducts Democracy Assistance Programs, Long Range Management Programs, and Military Stabilization Programs involving the training and equipping of armies in transition. As part of these programs, MPRI established and runs a Battle Simulation Center and a Combat Training Center."

Source: www.mpri.com/about/activities.htm

C. SECURITY ASSISTANCE DURING THE COLD WAR ERA

9. During the Cold War, external concessional assistance to the security sector of developing countries was of two main types: assistance to the security forces and security-related economic aid. Most of the assistance to the security forces was delivered by military or police personnel and focused on transmitting military or policing skills and on facilitating the sale of equipment to the security forces. Economic assistance was used primarily to support governments in countries allied with or friendly to the aid donor, and frequently took the form of budget or balance-of-payments support in order to reduce the burden of the recipient's security sector.

10. That these governments were sometimes run by the armed forces or relied on them to remain in power, that the security sector was generally not accountable to civil authorities, and that transparency was minimal was less important to the aid donors – in both East and West – than the willingness of these governments to support one or the other side in the Cold War. In short, security sector reform was not on the agenda of either the major powers or the major development agencies.

11. Prior to 1990, the United States was the major supplier of security sector assistance; the USSR was second. Other major providers of security sector assistance were France, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic and China. Toward the end of the Cold War, a number of non-NATO, non-Warsaw Treaty organisations began to supply security sector assistance. The most important of these were Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, and Iraq (prior to the 1980 Iran-Iraq war). Although Israel became an increasingly active supplier of weapons and military training, this occurred, as far as is known, on a cash basis, not on concessional terms.

"Description of Program – The proposed FY 1980 security assistance programme for Kenya consists of International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) financing. In addition, the Government of Kenya is expected to request to purchase spare parts and support items for equipment previously obtained from the U.S., communications equipment, small quantities of ammunition and FMS training through FMS cash procedures."

"IMET: The proposed programme would provide professional military training in command and staff courses, mid-level career courses, management courses and limited pilot and maintenance training programmes. This programme supplements the FMS financing programme of previous years which was largely dedicated to the acquisition of F-5 aircraft."

"FMS Financing: The proposed FMS financing for Kenya is expected to be used for acquisition of an anti-tank capability, to make small improvements in air defence capabilities, and to improve Kenya's logistic support capabilities."

Source: United States, "Congressional Presentation. Security Assistance Programs. FY 1980," Washington, DC, p. 287.

D. THE 1990s: NEW CONCERNS

12. After 1990, the strategic priorities of the major powers changed as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the beginning of political transitions in other Warsaw Treaty countries. In consequence, the number of external actors providing concessional security sector assistance declined, as did the amount of assistance provided overall. Some governments turned to private security firms to deliver portions of their assistance, such as military training. The composition of security sector assistance began to change as well, and development agencies became more actively involved in supporting reforms in the security sector.

University of Witwatersrand Defence Management Southern Africa Programme

The Objectives

The programme aims to:

1) Provide leaders in the defence sector – both civilians and military personnel – with dynamic interpersonal and leadership skills and to enhance conceptual, theoretical and management skills.

2) Explore key issues in defence planning and civil military relations.

3) Provide an environment in which key players in the Southern African security field can interact in a structured way in order to develop the basis for common security.

The Target Group

"The courses are designed for senior officers, senior ministry personnel and civilians involved in defence planning in the SADC member states."

"Participants should be committed to defining a new vision for defence in the region in the context of democratic civil-military relations and common security."

Source:
http://pc254.mgmt.wits.ac.za/P&DM/certprog/prog_m02.html

13. Assistance provided through **ministries of defence and armed forces** of several OECD member governments has in some cases been reoriented to train civilians in defence management, and some governments have provided both long- and short-term technical advisers to countries seeking to reform their defence sectors. A good deal of this assistance has been targeted on countries in Eastern Europe. Assistance has also been made available to Cambodia, Lesotho, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Recent transitions in Indonesia and Nigeria have made those two countries attractive prospects for security sector assistance, although no major programmes had been conducted in either country by the end of 1999.

14. Additionally, training for senior defence personnel as well as civilians on subjects such as civil-military relations and the role of armed forces in democracies is increasingly occurring through **regional programmes and centres** in Europe, Asia and Africa. In some cases, such as the Defence Management Programme at the University of Witwatersrand in South Africa and the Lester B. Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre in Canada, civil society has played an important role in conceptualising and implementing such training programmes. Regional organisations such as the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) and NATO have begun confidence and security-building activities intended to improve inter-state relations.

15. By promoting transparency among member states and providing technical assistance in areas such as defence planning, these activities can have beneficial effects domestically, by enhancing the value of and capacity for transparency and accountability in the defence sector. In some cases, notably the ARF, civil society actors have provided important input into the issues pursued and the positions adopted by governments.

16. Much of the credit for raising the profile of the security sector reform can be attributed to the then-president of the World Bank, Barber Conable and IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus. Both leaders began to argue in 1989-1990 that defence spending was "unproductive" and "wasteful" and that eliminating such expenditures was well within the mandates of both institutions. Among the bilateral donors, Germany and Japan took early note of the

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> *The IMF is primarily concerned about the impact of defence spending on macroeconomics stability and sustainable high-quality growth. The level of military spending is therefore considered when Fund staff assess macroeconomic prospects and development priorities under a Fund programme. While governments are encouraged to eliminate all forms of unproductive expenditure, including defence spending, the Fund's stated policy is that programs should not include conditionalities on the level of defence spending. Nonetheless, on occasion, governments have been required to give the Fund undertakings about the level and composition of defence expenditure to secure IMF loans.*
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> Source: Government of Canada and OECD Development Assistance Committee, Military Expenditures in Developing Countries. Security and Development, Paris: OECD, 1998, p. 33, and personal interviews.

subject and formulated specific policies for linking development assistance and defence expenditure. One common element among all of these activities was their focus on the *level* of expenditure, rather than on the *process* by which expenditure decisions were made, monitored, and enforced.

17. Early on, for example, the World Bank decided that the conditions that would give the Bank cause for concern were that defence spending was high or increasing, that government resources were severely constrained, and that priority development expenditures such as outlays for the social sectors were seriously underfunded. Although the World Bank and the IMF both take the position that conditionalities related to defence expenditure are not allowed, there has in fact been significant pressure from both institutions on a number of borrowing countries to reduce defence spending. Some of the pressure has come from Bank management and staff, but a good deal of it has been generated by the major shareholders of those two organisations, who tend to believe that applying conditionality is the most effective way of achieving their objectives.

18. Conditionality is not, however, the only instrument that donors have employed to promote

changes in the security sector of aid recipients. Over the last decade, development actors have engaged in dialogues with governments where, for one reason or another, military expenditure is deemed by the development community to be problematic. They have provided human rights training for members of the armed forces; supported demobilisation and reintegration; funded defence efficiency studies; and seconded security sector advisers to reforming governments. Development agencies have also supported a range of conferences, research projects, training activities, and studies on issues such as civil-military relations, conflict prevention, and measures to regulate the transfer of light weapons and the activities of private security firms. Civil-society organisations have received some assistance to enhance their capacity to monitor the security forces.

19. Police reform, especially in post-conflict environments, also gained increasing support during the 1990s. Governments that had previously been active in this area, such as the United States and Britain, revamped their programmes. Over time, the development community, along with other members of the international community, has come to realise that police reform is a long-term activity. It ideally requires a five- to ten-year commitment on the part of donors. Additionally, programmes need to become more holistic to encompass not only police forces but the broad range of institutions involved in the administration of justice – the judicial system, the

> *"Taking a holistic approach to the criminal justice system would entail conducting a detailed assessment of the local judiciary, legal codes, and penal systems, along with the police force; identifying the major deficiencies in each; and engaging in a dialogue with local authorities to determine how the resources of the international community can be applied to overcoming shortcomings... None of this will matter, however, unless local authorities manifest a willingness to cooperate and bilateral and multilateral assistance programs give judicial and penal reform adequate priority when resources are allocated."*
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> Source: Robert B. Oakley and Michael J. Dziedzic, "Conclusions," pp. 512-513, in Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security, ed. Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998.

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legal system, and the penal system. In consequence, there has been a greater emphasis on human and organisational capacity building and human rights training, as well as on the provision of non-lethal material, than in the past.

20. In contrast, however, development actors have to date provided relatively little support for capacity building or institutional development in the defence sphere. What assistance of this nature has been delivered has tended to be channelled through non-governmental organisations and focused on conflict prevention and stemming the proliferation of light weapons. Development assistance agencies are, however, taking a fresh look at their activities in this sphere, both individually and through the OECD Development Assistance Committee. What is more, the demand for such assistance is slowly growing in the non-OECD world.

E. INTO THE 21ST CENTURY: A FOCUS ON GOVERNANCE IN THE SECURITY SECTOR

21. If countries are to develop a sound institutional basis for conducting their affairs in the security sector that is consistent with democratic principles and sound governance practices and supports poverty-reducing development, it is critical that the assistance they receive supports these objectives. The various external actors that provide assistance should accordingly focus on the *process* of managing the security sector, in particular the development of an appropriate institutional framework and the requisite organisational and human resource capacity.

22. To some degree, external security actors have begun to address these institutional and resource aspects of security sector reform. For example, through its Outreach Programme aimed at Eastern Europe, the British Ministry of Defence has provided technical assistance for studies of democratic control of the armed forces, defence management practices, and planning and budgetary processes. Similar technical assistance has been provided to several African countries through British Military Assistance Training Teams (BMATTs) and the secondment of military and civilian MoD advisers to ministries of defence in countries such as Namibia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. US programmes such as the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) which is mandated to support civil oversight of the armed forces and transparent, accountable processes of resource allocation to the defence sector are financed by the US Department of Defense.

23. Important as these contributions are, defence actors cannot address all of the aspects of security sector reform that should be included from a developmental perspective. For example, they will not be involved in strengthening the capacity of ministries of finance or offices of the auditor general. Additionally, their approaches may not be as applicable in the poor countries as in OECD countries and the more industrialised countries in the non-OECD world. In preparing for the first seminar held under the auspices of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, for example, ACSS staff discovered that the US literature on defence economics had little, if any, relevance to the situation in Africa.

> *"Looking at military and security spending as simply 'unproductive' is passé. Instead the focus needs to be on the institutional framework that determines how budgets are established, implemented, and monitored."*
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> Source: World Bank, Post-Conflict Unit, Security, Poverty Reduction & Sustainable Development. Challenges for the New Millennium, Washington, DC: September 1999, p. 11.

24. The approach adopted by the development community has not, however, proven much more effective in achieving its objective of reducing inappropriate levels of defence expenditure. Focusing solely on the level and composition of military spending and the degree to which defence budgets "crowd out" development expenditures has not enabled the bilateral and multilateral development actors to achieve their objectives of lower defence spending and higher outlays on development. Governments may be forced to reduce the amount of resources allocated to the defence forces in their budgets, but that does not mean that fewer resources are actually being spent in the defence sector. Rather than learning to appreciate the value of good governance in the security sector, bad practices are being reinforced. Non-defence budgetary lines are used as pass-throughs to camouflage defence expenditure. Off-budget expenditure is frequently a problem of significant proportions. Profits from the sale of primary resources are skimmed to supplement defence budgets. Enterprises owned by the armed forces are used to fund defence spending.

25. Some development actors appear to have assumed that general support for governance will eventually lead to improved governance practices in the security sector, a sort of "trickle-across" phenomenon. This has led them to argue that conferences, studies, training activities and research projects on conflict prevention, practical disarmament, and civil-military relations contribute to better management of the security sector, and especially to reductions in defence budgets.

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In reality, these activities – which are important in themselves – fail to address the main constraints on good governance in the security sector. There is now a growing recognition that governance assistance needs to be targeted on the security sector if the high degree of autonomy enjoyed by security forces in many countries is to be reduced and if the capacity of civil authorities to manage and oversee these forces is to be strengthened. The discussion paper "Security Sector Reform and the Management of Defence Expenditure" prepared for this conference offers a conceptual framework for addressing one aspect of security sector governance.

26. The international community faces several challenges in shaping policies and strategies that will truly assist their partner countries in improving governance in the security sector. First, there is an urgent need to develop a comprehensive overview of the issues comprising security sector reform across all relevant areas of development, foreign, and security policy. Each organisation needs to develop a policy to guide its actions in supporting security sector reform that is embedded in this comprehensive perspective. Second, the various actors and mechanisms available for addressing the needs of countries undertaking security sector reforms need to be identified and some agreement reached on how these actors can work together productively. Third, external actors need to foster the commitment on the part of local leadership to a process of reform, to build on what exists locally, and to take local ownership seriously. Fourth, external actors need to prioritise confidence-building measures in their interactions with local counterparts. Finally, they must adopt a long-term view.

DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO SECURITY-SECTOR REFORM

27. In the past, efforts to support security sector reforms have been atomised, with attention focused either on the armed forces or on the police, and insufficient attention accorded to the civil authorities charged with managing and monitoring the security forces, and to civil society. There has also been inadequate attention to the linkages among these different actors and to the roles each could play in developing good governance in the security sector if their capacity were strengthened.

28. The broad objectives of support provided by external actors to security sector reform should be to:

- help create an enabling environment for reform or space for debate where incentives for reform are lacking;
- assist local actors in understanding the components of good governance in the security sector and in defining the process by which they will achieve this objective;
- assist local actors in developing and institutionalising mechanisms for developing, managing and monitoring security policy;
- strengthen the capacity of the civil authorities to participate fully in the process of managing and monitoring the security sector, including ministries of defence, justice, foreign affairs, and internal or home affairs; the finance ministry, budget office and auditor general; legislatures; independent ombudsmen's offices; civilian review boards;
- strengthen the capacity of non-governmental and community-based actors such as professional associations, research and advocacy institutes, and universities to participate fully in the process of managing and monitoring the security sector;
- professionalise civilians through training, mentoring and monitoring activities;
- pursue professional development of the security forces that imbues their members with an understanding of democratic accountability and strengthens their internal management capacity to implement and sustain reforms.

IMPROVING COHERENCE

29. Effective external support for security sector reform requires the collaboration of a wide range of actors – national, regional and international; governmental and non-governmental. Individuals with expertise in defence, policing, intelligence, managing security forces, defence budgeting, public-sector and fiscal management, foreign policy, the legislative process, development, and human rights need to develop methods of working together productively. This requires not only blending different types of expertise but also engaging a wide variety of

> *"Countries need help in assessing the threat to them and in deciding what they need in terms of resources to meet these threats... As a development agency, you want a country to get decent advice on military strategies."*
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> Source: Interview with donor agency representative, 1999.

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organisations with different goals and operating cultures. While such collaborations are not easy, they are vital to the success of multidimensional reforms such as those required in the security sector.

30. For such collaborations to be effective, external actors need to be in agreement on the policy to be pursued vis-à-vis individual reforming governments. The organisations that provide assistance to reforming governments need to be transparent about the activities they are supporting so that both governments and other external actors can understand the full range of reform programmes underway.

31. Additionally, donor governments and multilateral institutions that provide a range of assistance (security, political, development) need to be in agreement internally about the objectives of security sector reform, both conceptually and with regard to activities in specific countries. There have been numerous disconnects within bilateral governments: the financial and political imperatives of arms sales versus the objective of maximising resources for development; balancing the need to improve military-related skills of armed forces receiving military assistance with human rights considerations, and so on.

32. While these potential contradictions will never disappear entirely, it is important for governments and multi-task organisations such as the United Nations to discuss the problems in a frank and open manner and to make good faith efforts to co-ordinate policies and programmes. To facilitate this process, governments and other organisations should have a comprehensive security sector reform policy which outlines the principles underlying assistance for security sector reform and delineates the areas in which the governmental and organisational actors are to be involved.

33. At the operational level, one method for governments and multi-task organisations to achieve internal consensus and consistency is joint consultation of country strategy papers. Another is to develop an inter-agency or inter-departmental process to oversee security sector reform programmes. A third is to second staff from one government agency or division of an agency to another. The overarching objectives would be 1) to develop formal and informal channels of communication that function effectively

> *"...not all of the activities classified as security sector reform are appropriate to DFID. The Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence have complementary roles. Our work is focused on the issues of governance, conflict prevention, human rights promotion and post-conflict reconstruction."*
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> Source: "Security Sector Reform and the Elimination of Poverty. A Speech by Clare Short, Secretary of State for International Development," Centre for Defence Studies, King's College London, March 9, 1999, p. 5.

and 2) to build personal relationships that can transcend departmental or substantive divides.

34. Similarly, at the international level, the inclusion of security sector reform issues in existing co-ordination fora and mechanisms, such as the World Bank-led Consultative Group and the UNDP-led Round Table, should occur on a priority basis. There also needs to be close co-operation between aid missions and the diplomatic community, including military attachés. Embassies and foreign ministries need to make as much use of aid missions as possible, rather than fencing off security-related issues as so often occurs at present. For their part, development actors need to be open to such collaboration. Regional organisations and consortia of civil society organisations should also be viewed as key partners.

WORKING WITH LOCAL ACTORS

35. Without the commitment of national leadership to the process, security sector reform will fail. It is not necessary, however, for all relevant governmental actors to favour reform before external actors become involved. As long as there are a number of well-placed, influential allies, external actors can do much to increase understanding of the reform process and reduce opposition. In consequence, security sector reform issues should become a regular component of policy dialogue with governments. This dialogue will facilitate identifying entry points for building support for the reform process. To take one example, ministries of finance are frequently eager to gain control over security force budgets. Discussions of improving the efficiency of resources devoted to the security sector can provide an excellent entry point for broader discussions of organisational, institutional, and human resource requirements for transparent, accountable security sectors.

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36. External actors can provide incentives to governments to engage in security sector reform. These would vary from situation to situation. Some governments may be attracted by the opportunity to work with advisers – especially military and police advisers – from particular OECD countries. Others may accept additional resources as an incentive to include the security sector in ongoing reform processes. This could include, for example, broad "reform of the state" programmes or in more focussed efforts to strengthen the ministry of finance, the budgeting process, or the ability of legislative committees to function more effectively. In the European context, the desirability of joining entities such as the European Union and NATO has encouraged governments in Eastern Europe and the Baltics to seek to adhere to established norms in order to meet membership criteria.

37. Much of the discourse within the development community has, however, focused on conditionality, rather than incentives. Conditions generally relate to the amount of public expenditure devoted to the defence sector in comparison with social sectors, investment and other priority expenditure categories; to limitations on types of military spending; or to agreements not to raid non-military budget lines for increases in military spending (as the IMF did with Zimbabwe in 1999). While these are desirable outcomes, a process-oriented approach would be even more productive. For example, a country where preliminary dialogue has identified a base of support for some degree of security sector reform might be required to include the security sector in public expenditure reviews. Similarly, donors might assist governments increase the efficiency of resource use in the security sector.

38. External stakeholders experience a greater degree of success the extent to which they avoid imposing specific organisational structures and modes of operation. They must accept that there are different ways to achieve the end states of transparency, accountability and civil management and oversight. The objective should be to empower governments to discover what will work best for them. The South African government, for example, made an extensive study of institutions, organisational structures, legislation, and procedures in other countries in order to restructure its security sector. Similarly, at the beginning of its reform process, the Sierra Leone government educated itself about governance of the

> *"We need more dialogue between donor countries and developing countries, so that we operate from a shared basis of understanding and respect, and can find solutions together... The role of donor agencies is critical here. Through dialogue, they can gain a better understanding of the capacity of partner countries to tackle issues related to military spending and offer support that is appropriate and effective."*
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> Source: "Notes for closing remarks by the Honourable Dan Boudria, Canadian Minister for International Co-operation and Minister responsible for La Francophonie," in Government of Canada and OECD Development Assistance Committee, Military Expenditures in Developing Countries. Security and Development," Paris: OECD, 1998, p. 54.

security sector in a number of African and OECD countries.

39. Operationally, external actors can provide technical assistance to support efforts to learn about different management systems and structures for the security sector and to plan local reform processes. If such technical assistance is provided, continuity is extremely important. Local stakeholders are extremely pressed for time to reflect. Conflict-affected countries in particular face a myriad of urgent problems which are very difficult to prioritise and a limited number of people with the requisite interest and skills. Therefore, it is desirable to provide such countries with on-site personnel who can act as mentors to local stakeholders – in both the public and the non-governmental sectors.

THE IMPORTANCE OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

40. Members of the security forces and civilians are often suspicious of each other's motivations and objectives. The former may believe that civilians have no appreciation of security matters and will be unable to make decisions that are in the best interest of the security forces. Where security forces have been involved in human rights abuses or have pursued economic policies and corrupt practices that have severely weakened a country's economy, leaders of those forces are concerned that they will suffer retribution should civilian opponents gain power. Security force officers who have benefited personally

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from opportunities to engage in corrupt behaviour may strongly resist the institution of democratic practices and genuine civil oversight. Additionally, with the introduction of good governance principles and practices, members of the security forces often fear that their budgetary allocation will decline and, as a direct consequence, that they will lose the ability to deliver what is expected of them.

41. For their part, civilians who have lived in repressive societies fear the security forces and often find it difficult to interact with them. The fact that they are frequently at a disadvantage in terms of knowledge of defence and policing matters further adds to the reticence civilians experience to interact with representatives of the security forces. In such circumstances there may be a role for externally-mediated stakeholder dialogue to build trust between the civilian and military populations.

42. Furthermore, it is critical that external stakeholders proceed cautiously in their interactions with civilian and security force actors and not assume a degree of familiarity and a relationship that exists in many OECD countries. It is also critical to structure all activities relating to security sector reform so that they build confidence among local actors.

ADOPTING A LONG-TERM VIEW

43. Once embarked upon, it is critical that security sector reform be viewed as a long-term process, with the nature of progress shaped and conditioned by the pace of social and political change. Many police advisers, for example, speak of ten to fifteen year reform processes, and in reality, the timeframe for institutional reform should probably be calculated in terms of a generation. Some donors are able to commit to three-year programmes; many others operate on one-year time frames. As institutional development and reform takes centre stage, it will be preferable to think in terms of five-year rolling forward planning cycles. External actors will need to seriously consider at the outset when contemplating support for security sector reform whether they are able to commit to an end-state strategy of assisting governments to achieve a sufficient degree of reform so that the changes are sustainable.

> *"The seminar groups discussed the instruments of state power at length...*
> *Some groups focused on the utility of the tools of state power for African countries. One group concluded that the instruments of power are available to all countries, but that in reality there are substantial differences in the ability of countries to employ those tools. Participants argued that variations in the ability of countries to effectively use the tools of national security strategy are based on factors such as their relative size and the resources at their disposal."*
>
> *"The seminar groups then examined the utility of these tools of national security strategy in the African context. These discussions tended to emphasise several areas that are of particular importance to African countries and their leaders, including regional co-operation and regional organisations, corruption and good governance, and economic development."*
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> Source: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "Senior Leader Seminar, Dakar, Senegal, 1-12 November 1999. Academic Summary," p. 11.

F. CONCLUSION

44. There have been significant changes in the approaches adopted by external actors during the post World War II period, especially since the early 1990s. The most fundamental shift has been the growing recognition of the importance of strengthening the institutional framework within which the security sector operates. This paper has suggested a number of challenges that external actors face in shaping policies and strategies to assist partner countries improve governance in the security sector. There are three issues to which external actors should give priority in the coming years.

45. The first is to further develop the institutional approach to security sector reform, jointly with partner countries. It is important that the different groups of external actors – security, development/financial, and non-state – work together in this effort. One method of doing this would be to work closely with one or two partner countries interested in strengthening security sector governance. The outcome of these efforts could be documented in order to begin to build up a knowledge base of critical institutional factors, which policies and practices seem to function best under which conditions, and so on.

46. The second priority should be capacity building, for civil authorities, members of the security forces, and civil society. If the security sector is to be managed effectively and efficiently, members of the defence forces and civil oversight authorities need to have an understanding of the principles of sound public sector and public expenditure management as well as good practices in areas such as defence budgeting, planning, procurement, and auditing. Clarity about the hierarchy of authority between civil authorities and the security forces, and about the mutual rights and obligations of the civil authorities and the security forces is also critical. Finally, a relationship between the security forces and civil society that is based on respect for human rights should be fostered. Finally, civil society needs the capacity to actively monitor, direct, and control the security sector and to be consulted on a regular basis about security policies, resource allocation, and other relevant issues.

47. The third priority should be to build on what exists locally. While the security sector may not be the only component of the public sector whose management in need of strengthening in many countries, no country is a tabula rasa. Similarly, there is a small but growing number of security experts in Africa, Asia and Latin America that are already working to improve civil-military relations and the accountability and transparency of the security sector in their countries and regions. External actors should make a review of existing capacity a first step when contemplating any intervention in the area of security sector governance.

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