

A Survey of Security System Reform in Africa

Eboe Hutchful and 'Kayode Fayemi

About this survey

Changing political, economic and security circumstances have obliged virtually all African governments to consider some degree of reform that changes the way security institutions operate, are governed, funded, or relate to civilian constituencies. This survey, commissioned by the OECD-DAC, examines how reform in Africa is conducted and whether the 'reform' in question can be described as 'SSR' in the sense in which the OECD-DAC uses the term. The survey found that Africa security reforms are driven by a variety of (sometimes contradictory) trends and considerations. In many cases, SSR has been forced on states by external forces. These reforms are often piecemeal and short-term in character and rarely conform to the OECD-DAC definition of SSR. In particular, the new 'war on terror' approaches to security assistance threaten to have a significant impact on how SSR is approached in Africa by downplaying issues of governance, and shifting the emphasis back from 'soft' (or 'human') security to traditional (or 'hard') security.

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Summary

Changing political, economic and security circumstances have obliged virtually all African governments to consider some degree of reform that changes the way security institutions operate, are governed, funded, or relate to civilian constituencies. The key questions, though, which the Africa survey examines, are how reform is conducted and how much reform occurs, and whether the 'reform' in question can be described as 'SSR' in the sense (and terminology) in which the OECD-DAC uses the term¹.

The survey found that security reforms in African countries are driven by a variety of (sometimes contradictory) trends and considerations. In many cases, SSR has been forced on states by external forces, either as part of the process of rebuilding societies torn by conflict, or as part of a process of fiscal reform (or both). Nevertheless, these reforms are often piecemeal, narrowly focused and short-term in character and rarely conform to the OECD-DAC definition of SSR.

In addition, the survey also found that SSR terminology has yet to become fully familiar to African policy makers and securocrats. Even where new concepts such as SSR and 'human security' are entering the security discourse, understanding by governments of how they can actually operationalise these concepts is still very poor. As a consequence, faced with the lack of any clear conceptual and operational alternatives, old military-oriented security paradigms are rarely challenged.

Donors working on SSR in Africa are pursuing many different approaches, not all of which are consistent with the OECD-DAC approach. While some donor approaches are based on comprehensive SSR principles, others stress specific elements consistent with national policy priorities. In particular, the new 'war on terror' approaches to security assistance threaten to have a significant impact on how SSR is approached in Africa by downplaying issues of governance, and shifting the emphasis back from 'soft' (or 'human') security to traditional (or 'hard') security.

Ensuring that issues of governance and human security continue to receive appropriate emphasis in SSR in Africa is a key priority. A way around the potential conflicts in donor SSR programmes is to make the principles behind reform (and donor assistance) transparent and coherent and to co-ordinate reforms so that they consolidate rather than undermine each other. Donors should also seek to encourage governments to develop a participatory framework in which the concerns of all stakeholders are fully articulated and addressed.

¹ This survey was managed by the Conflict, Security and Development Group (CSDG) at King's College London (www.securityanddevelopment.org). For further information on the methodology for the survey, the key findings, and the implications for donors, see *CSDG Papers* No. 2, *A Global Survey of Security System Reform*, by D. Hendrickson.

Chapter 1

Introduction²

This chapter presents the findings of a survey of security-system reform (SSR) in Africa conducted during 2002-03. The survey covered 43 out of 53 African countries across five sub-regions: Central Africa, East Africa and the Horn, North Africa, Southern Africa and West Africa.³

Changing political, economic and security circumstances have obliged virtually all African governments to consider some degree of reform in their security institutions. Nevertheless, there have been few SSR programmes in Africa conforming to the OECD-DAC definition; even SSR terminology has yet to become fully familiar to African policy makers and seurocrats. Instances of SSR have been largely limited to countries that are coming out of conflict and are often—though not always—conducted under donor guidance. This is not to say that ‘reforms’ are not occurring in the security system of African states—on the contrary—but that these are often piecemeal, narrowly focused and short-term in character. Nevertheless, they do form essential entry points and building-blocks for more ambitious SSR programmes.

The chapter is structured as follows:

- Chapter 2 assesses the availability of information on SSR issues in Africa.⁴
- Chapter 3 examines the context for SSR in Africa, highlighting the factors that have put security on government reform agendas.
- Chapter 4 focuses on how ‘security’ is defined in the region, and contrasts this with the OECD-DAC SSR concept.
- Chapter 5 assesses the status of SSR in Africa, highlighting key factors that are necessary to understand current trends in this region.

² This paper was first published by the OECD-DAC as part of a report entitled *Security System Reform and Governance*, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, Paris 2005.

³ Ten countries were omitted from the survey because there were few relevant developments in the security system, or because information about such developments was difficult to obtain. The countries not covered are: *West Africa*: Cape Verde, The Gambia, Liberia, Burkina Faso, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, and Togo; *Southern Africa*: Swaziland; *Island Africa*: Madagascar and The Comoros.

⁴ Annex B provides a bibliography of selected publications on SSR in Africa.

Chapter 2

Information availability

The key sources of information for the survey were (in order of importance):

- The findings of research networks, particularly in Southern Africa (SADC) and West Africa (ECOWAS), in the area of both civil-military relations and SSR more broadly, but also occasionally in the area of policing. These findings are both comparative and case-study-based, and largely in the process of being published. The most important of these were the SADC network organized by the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS-Pretoria) under its African Civil-Military Relations Project, the project on Security-Sector Reform and Democratisation in Africa conducted by African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR-Ghana), and the network on Military Budgeting in Africa: Processes and Mechanisms of Control, organized jointly by SIPRI and ASDR. Some material was also drawn indirectly from the African Civil Military Relations project of the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS), to which both authors of this report contributed.
- The works (published as well as unpublished) of individual authors and researchers, which are mainly country studies. These sources are frequently less useful than they might have been, primarily because the work of African (and Africanist) political scientists has largely been within the old coup-driven civil-military relations paradigm (and now tends to be concerned with how the political power of the military might be curbed or contained). A new generation of research and publication more attuned to the needs and concerns of SSR and institutional change is only slowly emerging in Africa, and needs to be encouraged.
- Publications that monitor security system developments (such as the *African Security Review*, *Military Balance*, etc) and specialised reports (such as those by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) on francophone countries in 1997 and 1999 (cited in the tables).

- Interviews were occasionally utilized (those with fellow researchers being most useful), but their range was limited by considerations of funding and time. Questionnaires were also utilized (largely in an attempt to cover countries—mainly francophone—for which other sources of information had failed). But these elicited only limited response, as did interviews attempted (in Ghana) with diplomatic representatives and defence attachés from West African states.
- Official sources and documentation were consulted where available. Records of parliamentary debates and the work of parliamentary defence committees (where these could be obtained) were also useful.
- African and foreign newspapers and media (including internet sources and websites), occasionally carried items of interest about security system developments.⁵

Both sources and availability of information differed by region and country. In terms of geographical coverage, Southern Africa was probably best served, although there were significant country differences here as elsewhere (South Africa was exceptional in terms of the availability of both official and non-official sources of information, print as well as electronic) while North Africa appeared to be most problematic. This may well be because of the traditional security concerns (and concomitant lack of transparency) in that part of the continent, but may also reflect the lack of significant security system developments, consistent with limited movement toward political liberalisation in that region.

In general, information also proved difficult to obtain for many (though not all) Francophone countries. This is due to several factors: a tradition of ‘presidentialism’ (executive dominance) in defence and security matters and concomitant marginalisation of legislatures and civil society; a weak tradition (like France itself) of civil society analysis and discourse on ‘security’ issues, and traditional defence mechanisms and relationships (actually designed to protect regime security) with France that did not encourage transparency.

The challenges of gathering information on SSR show that the task of creating a wide-ranging and integrating concept of security is at a very early stage in Africa. Part of the problem stems from the fact that processes of knowledge generation and assimilation among policymakers and security personnel are very weak. Even where new concepts such as SSR and ‘human security’ are entering the security discourse, understanding of how governments can actually operationalise these concepts is still very poor. As a consequence, faced with the lack of any clear conceptual and operational alternatives, old military-oriented security paradigms are rarely challenged.

⁵ Among the official websites are those of the South African Department of Defence (www.mil.za), the Tanzania Ministry of Defence, the Mauritius Ministry of Defence and Home Affairs, the Nigerian Army (www.Nigerianarmy.net) and the armed forces of Egypt.

Chapter 3

Context for SSR

In recent years, a number of general factors have driven African countries to consider or undertake some degree of reform to their security institutions. This reflects a variety of contexts, including one or more of the following:

- Peace agreements which bring an end to conflict.
- Democratisation and dismantling of authoritarian (and often military dominated) political structures. New constitutions sanctioning more democratic governance frameworks for the security system have come into being (although the extent to which they are being implemented is very much a matter of debate).
- Fiscal restructuring and public expenditure management reforms.
- Changing strategic environments brought about by end of the end of the Cold War and associated conflicts (reflecting in this sense the fact that defence restructuring has after all become a global imperative).
- The emergence of regional collective security mechanisms (ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD), which are exercising increasing influence in force restructuring and disposition in the member countries.
- The deteriorating security situation in a large number of African states and the possibility that the African state itself is becoming less and less central to the control of violence and management of security. These states face new forms of violent politics and crime (often conjoined), proliferation of small arms, and competition from a variety of private and community security organisations, enhanced by the decomposition of the state's own security apparatuses (due, in part, to cutbacks in military expenditures and, in part, the scaling-down of external patronage).

Reforms may thus be driven by a variety of (sometimes contradictory) trends and considerations, and designed to promote or achieve a variety of political,

economic and social ends. At least as frequently, however, SSR has been forced on states by external forces, either as part of the process of rebuilding societies torn by conflict, or as part of a process of fiscal reform (or both).

However, a number of distinctive regional scenarios have also emerged in the background to SSR.

Southern Africa

The end of the armed conflicts in the region, first in Mozambique and then in South Africa, and the emergence of SADC, have transformed the dynamics in the region and facilitated far-reaching measures of demilitarization, security system restructuring, and regional integration.⁶ These processes are likely to deepen with the conclusion of the war in Angola. Already, common terminologies and frameworks are emerging in the sub-region in relation to security. In relation to the police for instance, 'community policing' has become the norm, even though the term appears to mean different things in different countries (by contrast, the concept is still rare elsewhere in Africa).

Another commonality lies in the way that SADC militaries are named (the term 'Defence Forces' has become the accepted way of naming national military forces). Dialogues over security and Defence Reviews have become more and more accepted as the norm in the sub-region; further convergence may become possible once the political rivalries within SADC have been resolved. On the other hand, new threats (small arms proliferation, violent/cross border crime, AIDS, drought, the war in the DRC) have emerged in the sub-region.

The prevalence of post-liberation regimes in the sub-region has given a particular coloration to civil-military relations, among these the close relationship between ruling regimes and their militaries, and the executive-centred systems of civil control. Both of these factors have helped to maintain political stability (and a greater awareness of force structures and dialectics among leaders). In some respects, such as Zimbabwe, they have acted as a break on the emergence of truly democratic civil-military relations. In spite of the convergence noted above, there is also increasing evidence of divergent trajectories among these post-liberation regimes: South Africa, for instance, is moving in the direction of a much more transparent and democratic security system model than the rest of its neighbours while at the same time exercising considerable influence as a role model in the sub-region.

West Africa

There have been three major drivers of SSR in the sub-region. The first is the transition from authoritarian (largely military or military-backed) governments.

⁶ One product of this has been mutual confidence-building and the emergence of a concept of 'defensive restructuring' in the sub-region. See Cawthra, Gavin and Moller, Bjorn (eds), *Defensive Restructuring of the Armed Forces in Southern Africa*, Aldershot: Ashgate 1997.

These transitions differ very much in quality and depth, with several instances of genuine democratisation (Mali, Benin, Senegal, Ghana, Cape Verde), but also a significant number of refurbished military and civilian autocracies, and increasingly (and intriguingly) cases of former military rulers returning to power through the electoral process (Kerekou in Benin, Obasanjo in Nigeria, and Toure in Mali).

The second major influence is the internal wars that have ravaged Liberia, Sierra Leone, and now Cote d'Ivoire, concomitantly with a deterioration in internal security in several of the remaining regimes in the sub-region (such as Nigeria). The end of the civil war in Sierra Leone has been followed by a comprehensive (if underfunded) SSR as the core of the peace-building effort; the peace settlement in the Cote d'Ivoire is also likely to be followed by a significant range of reforms and initiatives in the security system, as mandated by the current peace agreement. In Liberia, on the other hand, the failure to initiate any real post-conflict (surely an inappropriate term in this context) SSR following the 1997 peace agreement was directly responsible for the human rights abuses that emanated and the resurgence of civil war. The increased involvement by Liberians themselves in driving the 2003 Accra Agreements may result in greater 'demand' for SSR this time round.

A third, prospective influence is the ECOWAS conflict-management system, which is important as a framework for collective security and military cooperation; conflict-management, peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention; and norm-setting in the security system. However, as specified below, this has so far had little actual influence on the way that SSR is being conducted in individual West African countries.

East Africa and the Horn

The main contextual factors here include the post-liberation regimes in Ethiopia and Eritrea, the recently concluded Ethiopian-Eritrean war, the long-running conflict in the Sudan, the collapse of the state in Somalia, and the possible remilitarization of the Horn (Djibouti in particular) as a result of the war in Iraq and the war against terror. Ethiopia and Eritrea have launched far-reaching reforms of their security institutions, though these differ quite substantially in terms of sponsorship, philosophy and focus. The recent change of leadership in Kenya may also open the way for a review of the way security institutions function, particularly as the new Government seeks to restore relations with the donor community and international financial institutions that were damaged under the Moi regime.

Central Africa

This has been a volatile region of inter-locking conflicts and extensive military activity, involving a wide range of both official and non-state forces and interests. In addition to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which has involved most neighbouring countries, there has been a succession of attempted coups in the Central African Republic, ending with the overthrow of the regime of President

Ange Patasse in April 2003, and civil wars involving militias and armed forces in the Congo-Brazzaville. This has not formed a favourable environment for SSR: prospects for the peace process in Burundi (which also entails major reforms in the security system) brightened considerably with the handing over of power from the transitional government of President (Major) Buyoya to a new administration headed by a Hutu President. In the event, rebels of the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) have refused to lay down their arms and an upsurge in fighting in mid-2003 has dampened any immediate prospects of either a lasting peace settlement or SSR.

Nevertheless, there have been two notable SSR initiatives in the region: in the first case, the conduct of a comprehensive national 'Threat Assessment' in Rwanda in 2002 and the adoption of a new constitution by referendum in May 2003 point in the direction of potentially major developments in the security system; second, the Defence Review in neighbouring Uganda, culminating in 2003, which has been carried out in a broadly consultative manner and has involved an assessment of both military and non-military threats to the security of the state and the population. The Defence Review provides a framework for a longer-term defence transformation programme which the Government is currently considering how to undertake.

North Africa

This region has been less affected by political change than other regions of the continent, particularly in terms of political liberalisation, with long-ruling regimes hanging on to power. Security affairs have traditionally been conducted with relative lack of transparency; lack of public information makes it difficult to determine what, if any, reform of security apparatuses and governance structures has occurred in recent years.

The main factors structuring the security climate in the sub-region are (a) the continuing Middle-east conflict (b) the war in the Western Sahara (Sarahawi Republic) (c) the Algerian conflict (d) the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and (e) the threat of terrorism (materialised in both Tunisia and Morocco).

Chapter 4

How security is defined

Concepts of 'Human Security' have recently made inroads in African security thinking and documentation, partly because of the influence of the UNDP Human Development Report, and partly because of National Poverty Reduction Programmes, which mandate that even security institutions make a contribution to poverty reduction. Arguably, though, even earlier African antecedents of this concept may be found in African philosophies and discourses (such those of Nyerere, Nkrumah and Senghor) that argued the primacy of basic human needs and specifically rejected the acquisition of military power as the objective of state policy. Although the precepts of human security resonate deeply with African cultural heritages—Africans realise intuitively (as well as from bitter experience) that 'human security' (as opposed to the security of ruling regimes) is at the basis of any viable social and political order. For a variety of reasons the concept in its present form has come to be viewed as donor-driven. Nevertheless, there are indigenous versions of the concept, probably the most striking example of which appears in the South African White Paper on Defence' (see Box 1).

Box 1. South African White Paper on Defence

The White Paper defines security as:

'an all-encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being'.

The objectives of security policy are thus seen to include:

The consolidation of democracy, the achievement of social justice, economic development and a safe environment, and a substantial reduction in the level of crime, violence and political instability. Stability and development are regarded as inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing.

The South African formulation amply demonstrates the power and possibilities of the concept, not only in redefining the traditional concept of security, but also transforming the very basis and ethics of public policy, in at least three senses: first,

it no longer anchors the definition of security on the state, but sees regional, international, as well as sub-state forces as involved in the production of security; second, within the *state* itself, it re-conceptualises the institutions involved in security. Responsibility for territorial defence is no longer confused with overall responsibility for *security*, or with the military as the sole or primary security institution,⁷ and third, it sees ‘security’ and ‘development’ as ineluctably linked, ‘mainstreams’ security as both a public policy and a governance issue, and hence encourages public scrutiny.

Traditional African conceptions of ‘security’ have stressed non-military, existential components, including spiritual and psychological well-being (‘peace of mind’), the enjoyment of good health, food security, protection from cyclical stresses like drought as well from crime and violence, and access to essential social and community services.⁸ This has been conducive to expansive definitions of what constitutes ‘security threats’ in popular parlance (the Ugandan Defence Review, for instance, identified fully 134 ‘security threats’, of which only three were military in character) and has resulted in a weak emphasis on military/strategic planning.

The lack of elaborated definitions of security also points often to the absence of a national security framework in African countries and suggests, on the one hand, the limited role and capacity of civilians in strategic planning, and, on the other, the weak state of doctrine in African militaries (not surprisingly, African militaries have traditionally had a strong—even predominant—internal security role). In particular, democratic governments have brought little conception of strategic planning to their mandate, and only superficial notions of security and civil-military relations. This is not helped by the fact that there has been surprisingly little dialogue to create a common, coherent understanding of what ‘security’ is or should be: traditional concepts of (‘hard’) security continue to hold sway in African armed forces, largely as a result of training in foreign institutions or a reliance on foreign strategic models in military academies.

While concepts of human security remain (or express) the ideal, many Africans are skeptical of the capacity of their ‘broken’ states to attain the appropriate conditions for their realization. However, they do continue to insist on the obligation of the state to at least protect life and property. The latter has become the predominant concern with the growing violence and political disorder in the region. However, the proliferation of private and community security organisations reflects a perception of the need to hedge their bets even at this level.

⁷ According to the White Paper, while the SANDF remains an important security instrument of last resort, it is ‘no longer the dominant security institution. The responsibility for ensuring the security of South African people is now shared by many government departments and ultimately vests in Parliament’ (p. 6).

⁸ Surveys conducted under the World Bank’s *Voices of the Poor* suggest not only that popular African conceptions of ‘security’ may be quite different from the usage in the strategic (and official) literature, but that the word ‘security’ may sometimes be almost impossible to translate into vernacular languages, in which there are no direct equivalents. See for instance World Bank, *Consultations with the Poor: Ghana Country Synthesis Report*, Washington, DC: World Bank July 1999, p. 46.

Chapter 5

Assessment of findings

Virtually every African state is involved in some sort of reform that changes the way security institutions operate, are governed, funded, or relate to civilian constituencies. The key questions, though, are how reform is conducted and how much reform occurs, and whether, indeed, the 'reform' in question can be described as 'SSR' in the sense (and terminology) in which the OECD-DAC uses the term.

The findings of the Africa survey suggest that African SSRs need to be understood (and distinguished) in terms of several criteria.

Contextual factors: these reflect both institutional (type of security architecture and security system governance mechanisms) and political (nature of regimes and transitions) dynamics. In terms of the latter, we can identify: post-conflict peace-building (Sierra Leone, Mozambique, South Africa, Rwanda); transitions from military rule (Ghana, Mali, Benin) or single-party authoritarian dispensations (Tanzania, The Seychelles, Cape Verde); conquest of the state (Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea); contested transitions (Burundi), and so forth. Further, within each of these scenarios, sub-categories can be identified. SSR is thus taking place in a variety of terrains which confer particular dynamics.

African security institutions have also played very different roles in facilitating (or forestalling) democratic transition in general and SSR in particular, permitting (even collaborating in) regime change in some cases (e.g. Benin, Mali, South Africa), conniving directly or indirectly in regime rearrangement and various degrees of formal constitutionalisation (e.g. Ghana, Burkina, Guinea and Mauritania); aborting transition processes that were not 'going well' (Algeria, Abacha's Nigeria); or backing authoritarian rulers who opted to resist popular democratic pressures through repression (Togo, Cameroon and Mobutu's Zaire). African militaries have also been known to shift ground (reconsider their political stance) over the longer-term, either in terms of support for, or resistance to, greater democratisation (Nigeria and Ghana in the first instance, Burundi in the second).

A number of striking (and idiosyncratic) reform scenarios have thus developed: a first scenario where security institutions have partnered with civilians in transforming security institutions in the context of a genuine (or relatively robust) democratic transition (South Africa, to some degree Mozambique); another where reform of the security system, driven from above by the regime, is occurring with

limited public participation and in the context of limited democratisation (Ethiopia, Uganda);⁹ a third (and contrasting) scenario where democratic change, accompanied by significant improvements in civil-military relations, has yet to result in commensurate change in the internal organisation and governance of the security system (Benin, Ghana, Mali to a lesser degree);¹⁰ and a fourth where the security system is undergoing extensive restructuring even though the security institutions themselves are perceived as hostile or beleaguered (Sierra Leone). Further scenarios can doubtless be identified. The conclusion is that the reform of security institutions is not regime-dependent, democratisation is not by itself a guarantee of reform, and illiberal regimes are not necessarily resistant to reform (as they define it).

The political, security or financial imperatives to be addressed. SSR may be initiated for a variety of reasons. However, peace-building (power-sharing between warring factions, demobilisation, building new integrated armies); fiscal reform and deficit-reduction; improved control of crime; and the desire to enhance civil control, human rights (or the legitimacy of security institutions) seem to be the most common reasons for launching SSR. By contrast, restructuring as a result of changing military technology or strategic environments is relatively rare (although the latter was a powerful factor in shaping the South African programme).

Sometimes, however, SSR has been a by-product of other reforms, such as *public expenditure management reforms*. For instance, the introduction of Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEF) has been important in mainstreaming African military budgeting, bringing it into line with other state agencies, and making them at least somewhat more transparent than previously.¹¹ *Civil service reforms* may also have exerted some influence (an example being the impact of the Civil Service Law of 1993 on the organisation and staffing of the civil wing of Ghana's Ministry of Defence). *Governance Programmes* also seem to be facilitating openings into the security system (for instance, the UNDP-sponsored National Police Reform Programme in Ghana). In addition to MTEF, *National Poverty Reduction Strategies* (NPRS) have led to security system-wide planning (usually under the term 'Public Safety Sector'), though in many cases the profile of the security system in NPRS is actually quite low (examples again being Ghana and Mozambique).

The problem, of course, is that these objectives may (and often do) conflict, to the detriment of democratic control and human rights in particular. There is also a danger that excessive emphasis on deficit-reduction and fiscal stabilisation may gut security institutions (as has already happened in many African states).

⁹ Note that the degree of donor involvement in the two SSR programmes differs significantly, high in the case of Uganda, low in the case of Ethiopia (even though the latter is now receiving the attentions of a British Defence Advisory Team).

¹⁰ Parenthetically, these examples demonstrate that even the most successful pro-democracy movements have little agenda on the security system in general and the military in particular. Their notion of 'reform' seems to be limited to keeping the military out of politics, cutting their budgets (which they have done with some success), and involving them more in peacekeeping and domestic development effort. Beyond this, the military is left alone to its own devices. Militaries, often suffering a severe bout of political marginalisation, have gone along reluctantly with these schemes.

¹¹ This observation is drawn from a study on 'Military Budgeting in Africa: the Processes and Mechanisms of Control', carried out jointly by SIPRI and ASDR.

The *scope of reform*, which has ranged from the broad, relatively co-ordinated doctrinal and institutional reforms in South Africa, to the piecemeal, ‘firefighting’ approaches that tend to be characteristic of most African countries, and which are usually designed to respond to particular exigencies. The most comprehensive SSRs have been attempted in the aftermath of conflict (see below), as part of a peace agreement; outside of this context, most African regimes are modest and selective in what they attempt to accomplish in the security system.

The result is inherent lopsidedness in the kinds of reforms that are typically attempted. For instance, such reforms tend to focus on (a) on practitioner needs (anti-crime capacity building, professional training, peacekeeping training, etc.) rather than the needs of oversight institutions; (b) the military¹² rather more than the police (although this is being rectified) and far more on both than on Intelligence; (c) the formal rather than the informal or privatized security actors (local militia, vigilantes, community self-policing groups, private security companies, etc); and (d) short- rather than long-term in focus (e.g. disarmament and demobilisation rather than proper reintegration and professional development). As Box 2 suggests, then, a holistic approach to SSR (consistent with the OECD-DAC usage of the term) has been attempted in few cases.

Box 2. African ‘SSR’

South Africa and Sierra Leone are among the few examples where SSR in the OECD-DAC sense of the word has been attempted; indeed, SSR as a co-ordinated, multi-agency reform has yet to establish itself in the official African security discourse; at the moment, ‘reform’ is seen in specific institutional terms (eg: ‘police reforms’, ‘armed forces reforms’, ‘intelligence reforms’), characterised by few linkages across security institutions,¹³ let alone linkages to oversight institutions or civilian agencies. What this suggests, in short, is that while various forms of SSR (loosely interpreted) may have been attempted or in progress, few of these currently conform to the OECD-DAC definition. However, there are also several examples of African SSR that go well beyond the specifications (and vision) of the OECD. The objectives of ethnic/racial/gender ‘representivity’ and internal democracy that were placed very publicly on the agenda in the Ethiopian and South African reforms are unprecedented and represent new horizons of equity and transparency for this sector.

The extent to which SSR incorporates (or is governed by) formal principles, such as a strategic framework or fundamental law. Examples are the South African Defence Review and Intelligence Review, or the Mozambican Security and Defence Law of

¹² In addition, conversations on the military have tended to focus far more on its perceived development role, and its relationship with the civil population (rather than, say, on improving its obviously critical operational capacity), with the result that ‘what were previously considered secondary roles for the armed forces may indeed become areas of primary focus’ (National Democratic Institute (NDI), *Report of the Civil-Military Relations Assessment Mission: West and Central Africa, March 18 to April 10, 1997*, Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute, 1997, p. 12).

¹³ An example of this is the concurrent reforms in the Ghana Police (funded by the UNDP) and the Ghana Ministry of Defence and armed forces (funded by DFID). There are no overarching elements in these reforms, even though the two institutions collaborate closely in crime control and (in theory) disaster relief.

1997 (even though the difference is that the Mozambican initiative lacked a proper security review and the same degree of popular participation), or even the 'Code of Conduct' for the Malian armed forces. This kind of broad legal framework (or fundamental law) to regulate the security system has been popular in East and Central Europe, but remains uncommon in Africa (here Acts to regulate the individual services seem to be more the norm). In addition, only in the cases of South Africa, Rwanda and Uganda did SSR commence with an actual threat assessment/strategic review (Sierra Leone is in the process of conducting a strategic review).

The *processes* involved: in a number of cases, SSR has been preceded by negotiation and dialogue between political parties, civil society organisations, and the target institutions themselves. This was the case (to different degrees) in South Africa, Mali and Tanzania, as well as in the prelude to formal peace agreements in countries such as Mozambique and Sierra Leone. However, such broad and open dialogue is still the exception rather the rule; by contrast, many African countries and defence establishments (especially those not emerging from conflict) are involved in 'stealth reform', to which they would rather not call attention, and which dispenses as far as possible with public dialogue. (As in Latin America and Eastern Europe, military self-reform has also emerged as an important element in the equation, not surprising given the fact that in many countries the military remains far ahead of newly elected civil dispensations in their knowledge of defence issues, and are thus in a position to retain some initiative).

And there may well be good reasons for doing reform on the quiet: military expenditures continue to be a controversial issue in many countries, the relations between security establishments and citizens are strained, and many newly elected governments are unsure of their ground when dealing with the military. Correspondingly, SSRs differ in their degree of transparency (and hence researchability as Box 3 illustrates). 'Open' reform is almost always the result of one or both of the following situations: a post-conflict situation where force structures form a key focus of political negotiations; and/or a 'political revolution' which aims at broader political transformation (both apply to various degrees in South Africa and Ethiopia).

Box 3. How easy is it to conduct research on SSR?

Information on the South African programme is widely available in print, electronic and other media both inside and outside the country. Though not as well researched, Mali's civil-military programme has been accessible to the public, though not to the same degree as far as internal military issues are concerned. Information has not been as readily available in the public domain about Ghana and Benin, for instance (two other countries where significant progress has been made in civil-military relations), and even less is available about the majority of African countries. Nigeria is a bit of a special case. Owing to the contested and controversial nature of military rule in that country, the Obasanjo regime has been fairly public with its plans for military restructuring (in addition to a number of dramatic public actions against the military brass from the previous

regime) while at the same time fairly secretive about some of its policy initiatives (such as the training agreement with the MPRI). However, the existence of a large and aggressive body of civilian researchers has meant that information has been relatively available in the public domain. In Uganda, a public information campaign accompanied the Defence Review.

SSRs may also be distinguished in terms of their *generation*. Current generation SSRs are governed by certain broad normative principles: democratic control and accountability, public participation, the latest public expenditure management norms, and a holistic approach. These may be distinguished from earlier reforms of security institutions such as those in Nigeria in the aftermath of the civil war, South Africa as it prosecuted its war of destabilisation against the ANC and its neighbours, and Uganda in the aftermath of the NRM victory. Current SSRs in all three countries bear little semblance to these earlier exercises.

The *actors or players* involved, in particular the context, form and degree of donor involvement. Unlike the traditional 'military assistance programs', SSR has tended to be much more *development donor*-dominated and multi-agency in character. Donors have been driven by different objectives and have utilized a variety of entry points. In general, the three most important of these have been 1) post-conflict reconstruction 2) public expenditure reform and 3) poverty-reduction programmes, or some combination of the three. Donor interventions have tended to be characterised by lack of co-ordination, even between departments in the same government. However, this problem has increasingly been recognised (e.g. the best example at the country level are the Conflict Prevention Pools in the UK, which has informed a change in approach by the Canadians. A broader inter-donor coordination is also emerging in the EU). On the whole, the role of external actors has been much weaker in shaping SSR in Africa than in regions of greater strategic interest to donor countries (Eastern and Central Europe in relation to the EU and NATO, and Latin America in relation to the US), where SSR has also tended to have greater normative coherence.

The role of donors has been limited in most cases to funding and facilitating DDRR (usually co-ordinated by the local UN Mission on the peace-building side or the UNDP and the World Bank on the development side). Direct donor engagement with SSR as such is still relatively rare. The few existing examples include DFID (which has exercised leadership in the development of SSR as concept) in Sierra Leone and now Uganda and (increasingly) Ghana,¹⁴ and perhaps even the role of the UNDP in the development of the Malian Code of Conduct. DFID has also been involved in police reform in several SADC countries (there was extensive donor involvement at several levels in the police reform process in South Africa). The British were involved through BMATT in military integration and retraining in (Namibia?), Zimbabwe, South Africa, and now Sierra Leone (actually IMATT). 'Traditional' bilateral relations in the military arena continue to flourish (the US

¹⁴ Usefully, DFID is also helping to promote 'South-South Dialogues on Defence Transformation' in the context of its work in these countries.

maintains extensive links through IMET and other programmes), much of it focusing on peacekeeping training (ACRI, RECAP, BMATT again). In a number of cases, donor influence in or oversight of SSR (direct as in the case of Sierra Leone or indirect as in the case of Guinea-Bissau) has been almost total. In spite of this, donor impact in SSR has been determined very much by the political will and responsiveness of the regime involved (contrast Mozambique and Sierra Leone as 'good performers' with Guinea-Bissau).

There are other types of external involvement worth mentioning, even though these take the form of providing a forum for dialogue and civics lessons rather than direct reform initiatives, and address a regional rather than country context.¹⁵ These include the work of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI).¹⁶

In terms of *local actors*, SSRs have tended by their very nature to be driven primarily by (the executive branch of) governments and donors. With a few exceptions (most prominently South Africa), Parliaments have been relatively marginal actors in defence management and oversight, constitutional provisions notwithstanding. However, several regional NGOs such as Africa Leadership Forum (ALF) and GERDDES-Afrique have been active in dealing with security issues, as have a number of African civil society networks (including the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR), the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS), SaferAfrica, and the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), which have been active in running their own fora and research networks and advising donors, African governments and military institutions. NGOs enjoyed a particularly high visibility in the South African programme, in part due to the transparency and consultative character of that programme, in part due to the unusual sophistication of local actors in this arena. In much of Africa, however, the role of NGOs/CSOs has been limited by a combination of political constraints and limited capacity and interest. Surprisingly, the role of political parties in SSR in Africa seems to be even more negligible. Participatory spaces for non-state actors are often best enhanced where donors specifically provide for them as a condition of assistance (as DFID has increasingly tried to do).

Some reference should also be made to the *role of regional and sub-regional 'security complexes'*. While these have aimed for mutual confidence-building and norm-setting, their actual influence on SSR at this stage remains debatable (other than perhaps in the area of planning for peacekeeping and possibly crime control). Their establishment has also given rise to new problems of accountability (for instance, many of the interventions conducted under the aegis of ECOWAS and SADC did not involve consultation with or approval by national legislatures or political

¹⁵ And hence may not appear in the country tables.

¹⁶ The ACSS has run annual Senior Leader Seminars for civilian and military officials (in addition to a variety of sub-regional meetings on topical security issues); the GCA has an annual Africa-wide forum on civil-military relations; and the NDI has focused in particular on the role of parliaments in defence management and oversight.

constituencies). The interventions carried out by these sub-regional bodies have also revealed significant internal cleavages, suggesting that diplomatic and security collaboration still have some way to go.

Assessing overall country performance

While it is still early in the day, African countries appear to have performed unevenly on issues of SSR, ranging from solid progress toward democratic civil-security relations (South Africa, Mali, Benin, Senegal, Ghana) to others (such as Togo, Cameroon, Guinea, and—until recently—Kenya) where the military and security forces are deployed routinely and blatantly against political opponents. In between the two extremes are a large number of more fluid cases where formal institutions have been established (under the constitution) to oversee security, but where such institutions have yet to develop the requisite capacity. Paradoxically, durable civilian regimes seem to have been slowest to transform their civil-security relations in a more fully democratic direction. Such regimes – and here we include former liberation movements (Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Namibia), liberalising single-party regimes (such as Kenya, and—until recently—Cote d’Ivoire) and quasi-democracies (e.g. Senegal and Botswana) tend to have executive-centred systems of control and weak legislative and civil society oversight. There is some consensus that South Africa’s SSR has set new standards (or ‘best practices’) in terms of process (inclusive and consultative), scope (comprehensive), transparency, and ownership (primarily if not entirely indigenous).

SSR in post-conflict environments

Ironically, overall the most hospitable political environment for ‘full-bore’ SSRs in Africa has been post-conflict situations—also the kind of context that (for better or ill) facilitates relatively unfettered donor interventions. On the other hand (politics apart), these are also the precise contexts that pose the most formidable challenges to SSR, owing to:

- Lack of functioning security institutions, as well as the most basic civil institutions capable of undertaking complex tasks of designing and implementing SSR;
- Proliferation of both formal and informal armed formations, requiring complex and demanding DDRR processes;
- The need to eliminate both the embedded legacies of violent conflict (e.g. militaristic values and a culture of impunity), and the material and economic supports for continued violence (e.g. arms proliferation, illicit resource extraction, and so on);
- The need to resettle displaced populations and marginalised youth;

- The need to restore some form of economic normalcy and long-term development.

However, these are not the only reasons why post-conflict SSR has such a mixed record. As an approach to building stable and democratic civil-security relations, the foreign-brokered peace process¹⁷ is fundamentally flawed. To begin with, negotiations have usually been limited to armed parties with the most direct investment in violence, rather than the forces advocating for peace. Donors have tended to focus on short-term objectives (securing an early end to hostilities, followed by demobilisation) rather than the reintegration of ex-combatants, reprofessionalisation of the armed forces, and building of institutions of democratic oversight—all necessarily longer-term, more complex and resource-intensive processes. And since the ‘demand’ for SSR may come predominantly from donors, and is not ‘owned’ by indigenous forces or grounded in local norms or culture, they also tend to be relatively shallow and unsustainable. Finally, though important in forging peace agreements and forcing the initial process of political liberalisation, external influence has been much more limited in shaping election outcomes and virtually irrelevant in determining the nature of the regime emerging from them.

Even so, conflict situations are not without their silver lining. Certainly, one ‘positive’ outcome is the way in which conflict forces even greater attention to issues of SSR. This is manifest in four ways:

- A clearer recognition that settling the question of the composition, disposition and control of force structures is central to any political settlement, and ultimately, to democratisation itself;
- More holistic approaches to dealing with force structures, formal as well as informal;
- Leaders who tend to be much more savvy on both political and military issues;
- The fact that conflict has often given rise to new institutions, social and economic relations, and forms of consciousness.

Key constraints to SSR

In spite of the contextual differences, and some significant exceptions, SSR programmes in Africa (where they do exist) tend to be characterised by a number of general shortcomings. They are often:

¹⁷ Note that this discussion does not extend to those situations where post-conflict SSR has been driven exclusively or predominantly by indigenous forces, such as in Ethiopia, Eritrea or South Africa.

- Donor-driven and lack local ownership (e.g. Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau). By contrast, there are programmes with high levels of local ownership (South Africa, Ethiopia, Mali);
- Under-funded (true of virtually all instances);
- Ill-adjusted to domestic institutional (and resource) capabilities (Sierra Leone);
- Non-holistic and ad hoc, lacking coordination and the benefit of an overarching national security policy¹⁸ (to date most African countries lack a national security policy and defence policy though the ongoing work on a new 'Common' African policy may provide an enabling framework for such developments at the national level—see Box 4);
- Fragmented or lop-sided in focus (as suggested above);
- Characterised by lack of political will, weak government leadership and inter-agency collaboration, lack of transparency and participation, and weak (or non-existent) policy and strategic frameworks (this is true of most instances of SSR).

Lacking adequate linkage with the regional context and emerging collective security mechanisms. (Except in the South African case, SSR has remained essentially a national exercise with little regard for the evolution of regional collective security mechanisms, other than in the area of peacekeeping.)

Box 4. Common African defence and security policy

During the inaugural Summit of the African Union (AU) in July 2002, the AU Assembly stressed the need for a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) in compliance with the Constitutive Act of the AU to safeguard against 'common threats' to the continent. The objectives and goals of the CADSP are to, among others: enhance a common vision of defence and security with the expansion of the definition of both to include human security; ensure a collective response to threats to Africa; promoting mutual trust and confidence among African States; and to provide a framework for post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction. A Draft Framework for the CADSP was passed in January 2004 and the policy is expected to be formally adopted by the African Union at its next meeting in the summer of 2004.¹⁹

Finally, there appear to be significant gaps between formal structures and informal (or real) practices in this arena, often because of underlying power relations. A good

¹⁸ And oftentimes contradictory. A case in point is Ghana, where the current government, like many elected regimes, is facing the paradox of being committed (in theory) to demilitarising national politics, and yet having to use the military extensively in crime-control (with sometimes unpleasant consequences for legality and human rights) as well as expanding its role in development (both apparently popular with the public).

¹⁹ http://www.iss.org.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/au/cadspjan04frm.pdf.

example of this is worth quoting from the NDI report on francophone legislatures, where it was found that:

...legislators—despite their interest in the military—appeared to take a minimalist, hands-off approach on military issues and questions of national defence. Although appropriate committees exist for such oversight in the legislatures of the countries visited, parliamentarians seemed to exercise little genuine oversight of the military. None of the legislatures visited possessed in-house expertise on defence issues, nor have they sought outside expertise on such issues when reviewing budgets or defence related bills. Rather, the legislator is expected to vote on bills drafted by the executive branch.²⁰

This statement has lost none of its force since it was first made (in 1997) and could easily be replicated for most African governments.

Some of these shortcomings spring inevitably from the dynamics of weak states, the lack of capacity of policy and oversight institutions, and the often severely deteriorated character of security establishments. However, they are as much the result of the inherent limitations of the SSR concept itself and the circumstances under which it rose to prominence. While OECD-DAC has tried to confer some rigour and uniformity to the concept—stressing for example a governance dimension, a holistic and integrated approach addressing the needs of both security and development, and of security institutions as well as oversight bodies, etc.—‘SSR’ in Africa unfortunately appears to have become somewhat of a catch-all phrase, with donors pursuing many different approaches, not all consistent with this approach. While some donor approaches have tried to capture these comprehensive principles, in some if not all contexts (this is the case with the UK approach to SSR in Uganda for instance—see Box 4), others have stressed specific elements consistent with national policy priorities or heritage.

Box 5. Uganda’ security policy framework

The first phase of Uganda’s Defence Review involved a Strategic Security Assessment that consisted of analysing the security threats of both a military and non-military nature that Uganda could expect to face in the future. Once key threats had been identified, categorised and ranked, then a cross-governmental discussion took place to assess which ministries and agencies had responsibility for addressing which security threats. The outcome of this assessment was a Security Policy Framework (SPF) paper which outlines a new integrated and wide-ranging concept of security for Uganda. The SPF currently has the status of a consultative document. However, it provides a basis for an eventual national security policy if Government decides to further debate and refine the framework. The SPF provided a basis for developing a new

²⁰ National Democratic Institute (NDI), ‘Report of the Civil-Military Relations Assessment Mission: West and Central Africa’, 18 March to 10 April 1997, Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute, 1997, p. 20.

Defence Policy. A number of other security actors, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Internal and External Security Organisations, also reviewed their own policy frameworks in light of the SPF.

The outcomes of this fragmented approach include:

- Persistent conflicts in most donor-supported SSR programs between fiscal and security imperatives²¹ (at least until recently, the primary objective of SSR for many donors was to reduce security expenditures, which were deemed antithetical to ‘development’);
- Prevalence of narrow institutional approaches (focusing on, say, police to the exclusion of the military or the other way around, or conflict and justice mechanisms but not security institutions), resulting in different donors occupying particular turfs within the same country;
- Cleavage between concepts of ‘human security’, espoused mainly by international development organisations, and traditional (‘hard’) security doctrines, which continue to be articulated by African security establishments and foreign powers like the United States.

In particular, little has been put in place to enhance the capacity of civilians to make an input into strategic planning or oversight processes. Moreover, the intent behind some approaches to SSR seems (consistent with the term ‘reform’) to be a re-engineering of often decrepit and discredited institutions and a re-centring of the state in the security game, rather than a fundamental rethinking of security, strategic concepts and frameworks, and governance institutions. The donor SSR literature is often suffused with technocratic and apolitical conceptions (often derived from previous—and often unsuccessful—exercises in public sector reform) when the central priority in most African countries is to alter the relations of power within the security system and society at large, often in societies with a history of direct or indirect military dominance, as a necessary prelude to civil control, transformation of institutional culture, etc.

The evolving international environment may also have a significant impact on how SSR may be conceived (or rethought). Within the United States itself, the ‘war on terror’ has been accompanied by curbs on due process and traditional civil and other rights. Within Africa and other developing regions (with even weaker traditions of protection of human rights), the anti-terror approach may have a major impact on the way ‘security’ is conceived and SSR approached, for example by downplaying issues of governance, shifting the emphasis back from ‘soft’ (or ‘human’) security to traditional (or ‘hard’) security; reviving cold-war partnerships

²¹ This has been a big issue in Uganda for instance, with the donors imposing an arbitrary cap of 2% of GDP on military expenditures in the late 1990s, and the Museveni government insisting that much more spending is required in view of the continuing security threats to the country. The Defence Review that was recently completed is intended to establish a baseline upon which security threats and defence spending needs can be more objectively assessed.

with dictatorial regimes; suppressing local opposition and undermining legitimate local struggles for group rights by dubbing them as ‘terrorist’. (This is a game that some African regimes are already playing well).²²

There is thus a need to ensure that issues of governance and human security continue to receive appropriate emphasis in SSR, and that the necessary short-term trade-offs do not compromise long-term SSR goals. Broadening the range of local stakeholders in the process is critical to these outcomes.

²² For example: Ethiopia (which is emerging as one of the ‘frontline’ African states in the ‘war on terror’, has launched a number of unannounced forays into Somalia on the pretext of suppressing ‘terrorist’ and ‘fundamentalist’ groups (in reality, this likely includes groups with irredentist claims on the Ogaden).

Chapter 6

Conclusions

There is a need to understand the diversity of problems (and sensitivities) and process issues to be addressed in SSR in Africa, the full range of resources required to address them (and these can be substantial), and the potential conflict of objectives that can result. A number of observations from the survey are particularly pertinent and should be reiterated.

The survey suggests that SSR can be undertaken for a wide range of reasons, and alludes to the potential conflict of objectives that can result in the process, such as between the need to enhance democratic control and accountability, on the one hand, and operational capacity (effective protection from security threats) on the other. Another tension is between deficit reduction (which has led to often unsustainable cuts in military expenditures in particular) and the need to invest in effective and sustainable security structures as a necessary prerequisite for (among other things) development.

The way around such conflicts is to: (a) make the principles behind reform transparent and coherent and (b) coordinate reforms so that they consolidate rather than undermine each other. Secondly, such conflicts can also be minimised only if there is a participatory framework in which the concerns of all stakeholders are fully articulated and addressed. Participatory spaces for all stakeholders (and particularly for non-state actors) are in turn often best enhanced where donors specifically provide for them as a condition of assistance (as DFID has increasingly tried to do).

A second critical observation is that African SSR has tended to be both piecemeal and characterised by lack of transparency (in part because of the political sensitivity of such exercises). While this is not ideal, there is perhaps a realistic reason for these piecemeal approaches. 'Full-bore' SSR is expensive in terms of resources, institutional capacity, and political will and leadership. Thus programmes deliberately designed to accomplish long-term transformation are the exception rather than the rule (South Africa being perhaps the only country with the capacity to attempt (simultaneous) reforms of such scope). Indeed, given the institutional and resource constraints that characterise African countries, there is a real possibility that the elevated benchmarks often associated with SSR will represent overkill. A set of more modest core goals (such as gradual and monitorable improvements in

transparency, in sensitivity to human rights issues, and in the quality of defence and security management) would be more realistic.

Third, the deterioration of the security situation in many African countries, often as an outcrop of democratisation (in particular the explosion of armed robbery and other forms of violent crime) means that both security institutions and publics have tended to place the emphasis on trying to guarantee physical security and may become rather tolerant of possible abuses of legal and human rights. The injection of the military into crime control (often reflecting greater public confidence in the military than police) is one indication of this. But even more indicative is loss of confidence that the state (to the extent to which it is not itself a 'security threat') can provide any sort of security, and the turn to private and community security mechanisms.

Paradoxically, then, while much effort has gone over the last decade into elaborating 'extended' concepts of security (such as 'human security'), Africans in many cases have become increasingly concerned with 'security' in its narrowest and most 'primordial' sense, physical security. This is not a rationale for donors to back away from a 'governance' or 'human rights' perspective on reform (on the contrary). It is, however, an argument to incorporate both operational and governance perspectives into their SSR programmes—thus ensuring effective law enforcement and public order in a context of accountability and good governance of the security system—and in particular to avoid excessive emphasis on deficit-reduction and fiscal stabilisation likely to disable security institutions even further.

Annex A

Organisational details

African Security Dialogue and Research, Accra, Ghana (www.africansecurity.org)

The African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR) is an independent, non-governmental institute based in Accra, Ghana, specialising in issues of security and their relationship with democratic consolidation. The core aims of the ASDR are to:

- Foster dialogue and consensus with regard to issues of conflict and security in Africa, focusing in particular on the role and governance of security forces;
- Undertake research, analysis, monitoring, and advocacy on issues relating to civil-military relations and national and regional security in Africa;
- Enhance oversight capabilities of national legislatures and elected representatives by promoting collaboration with defence experts and researchers;
- Strengthen the capabilities and resources of civil society and NGOs in the analysis and discussion of defence and security sector issues;
- Improve overall availability of defence-and security-related information in the public domain through support for new research and development of a database.

Centre for Democracy and Development, Lagos and London (www.cdd.org.uk)

The Centre for Democracy and Development is a non-governmental organisation which aims to promote the values of democracy, peace and human rights in Africa and especially in the West African sub-region.

CDD works through advocacy, training and research in the areas of Governance, Human Rights, Peace and Security, Environment, Gender, Social & Economic Development.

Current projects include:

- Promoting Constitutionalism in Africa;
- Promoting Dialogue as a means of conflict resolution, and Building the Capacity Of Security Actors, Oversight Bodies & Civil Society;

- Private Military Intervention & Arms Proliferation in Conflicts in Africa;
- Peace & Security Cluster in NEPAD;
- Children in Armed Conflict;
- Stability-Security Monitor (SM).

Annex B

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